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This Article develops the framework of comparative institutional analysis for
assessing the implications of judicial interpretation in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The analytical framework offers an improved means to
describe and assess the consequences of choices made in treaty drafting and
interpretation in terms of social welfare and participation in social decisionmaking. The analysis builds on specific examples from WTO case law. Our
framework approaches treaty drafting and judicial interpretive choices through a
comparative institutional lens — that is, in comparison with the implications of
alternative drafting and interpretive choices for social welfare and participation
in social decision-making processes. By deciding among alternative
interpretations, the judicial bodies of the WTO effectively determine which social
decision-making process decides a particular policy issue. That decision, in turn,
can have profound domestic and international implications. While this Article
focuses on the WTO, the framework developed here has general relevance for
understanding the interpretation of international and domestic legal texts from
“law and economics” and “law and society” perspectives.

Introduction ........................................................................................................105
I.
The Parameters of Institutional Choice in Dispute Settlement
and Interpretation .......................................................................107
* Gregory Shaffer is Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law
School; Joel Trachtman is Professor of International Law at The Fletcher School of Law &
Diplomacy, Tufts University. We are grateful to Jeffrey Atik, Laurence Helfer, Robert Howse, Neil
Komesar, Gabrielle Marceau, Petros Mavroidis, Joost Pauwelyn, Sol Picciotto, and participants at
conferences at the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law and the European
University Institute for their comments, and to Ryan Kelley, Nate Nesbitt, and Mary Rumsey for
their research assistance. Errors are ours.

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1788244
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788244

104

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 52:103

II.

Institutional Choices in Treaty Drafting: Rules, Standards,
Interpretive Guidelines, and Ex Post Supervision.................109
A.
Rules versus Standards ...............................................................110
B.
Delegation to Other International Organizations or
Processes .................................................................................... 112
C.
Specifying Interpretive Rules ....................................................114
D. Retaining a Veto ..........................................................................118
E.
Interpretive Communities and Member Defiance.................119
III. Judicial Interpretive Choice within WTO Dispute Settlement
as Institutional Choice................................................................120
A.
Allocation of Decision-Making to WTO Political
Processes, or to Subsets of WTO Members...........................123
B.
Recognition of Other International Political Processes
through Taking Account of Other International Law ..........127
C.
Textual Incorporation of Other International Law;
Delegation to International Standard-Setting Bodies............133
D. Delegation to Experts Regarding Factual Issues ...................135
E.
The Institutional Choice of Judicial Balancing.......................140
F.
Delegation to Markets ...............................................................144
G. Vertical (Re-)Allocation: Deference to States.........................147
H. Process-Based Review................................................................149
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................152
“[A] choice there has been.”
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 1
“Human relations are too numerous, too complex, and too dynamic to be
susceptible to sufficient regulation by means of several verbal formulae,
issued at a fixed time and with regard to a situation, impossible to grasp
with a single glance . . . .”
François Gény, Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law 2

1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921).
2. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 404
(2d ed. 1954) (“Les rapports humains sont trop nombreux, trop complexes, trop changeants, pour
trouver un règlement suffisant, en quelques formules verbales, édictées à un moment fixe et en
présence d’une situation impossible à embrasser d’un seul coup d’œil . . . .”).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will develop a new framework for understanding the
drafting and interpretation of World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements — that of comparative institutional analysis. Our aim is to
provide a framework that offers a better means for describing and
assessing the consequences of choices in treaty drafting and interpretation.
We will draw on specific examples from WTO case law to make our case.
Both treaty drafting and judicial interpretation implicate a range of
interacting social decision-making processes, including domestic, regional,
international, political, administrative, judicial, and market processes, that
we will collectively refer to as institutions. Our definition of institutions has
a different focus from those definitions conventionally used in institutional
economics, which views institutions as constraints on future decisionmaking that are established to increase welfare. 3 Our framework focuses
attention on the ways in which institutions determine social decision-making
processes, thereby affecting participation and welfare. While this Article will
focus on the WTO, the framework developed here has general relevance
for understanding the interpretation of international and domestic legal
texts from “law and economics” and “law and society” perspectives.4
Choices over alternatives in treaty drafting and subsequent judicial
interpretation can both be viewed in terms of institutional choices — that
is, in terms of their implications for different social decision-making
processes. These drafting and interpretive choices affect the articulation
and institutional mediation of individual preferences. By affecting which
institution decides a policy issue, these choices ultimately affect social
welfare. Our framework shows how these choices can be viewed through a

3. Cf. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 30 (2006) (defining an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and
organizations”); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (defining institutions as “rules of the game”); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1 (1985) (“[T]he transaction cost approach

maintains that these institutions have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction
costs”).
4. In particular, this Article will build on the important work of Neil Komesar, who has applied
comparative institutional analysis to the interpretation of U.S. public and private law. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1996); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001); see also
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (2006); Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991). For earlier applications of comparative institutional choice in WTO law,
see, for example, Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institutional Choice
Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2008); Joel Trachtman, The Theory of
the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis,
17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470 (1997).
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comparative institutional lens — that is, in comparison to the implications
of alternative drafting and interpretive choices for different institutions.
In the case of the WTO, drafting and interpretive choices implicate the
interaction of institutions for domestic, regional, and global governance.
WTO judicial interpretive choice is constrained by treaty design, text, and
prescribed interpretive approaches. We thus first address important design
choices faced by treaty drafters from the perspective of comparative
institutional choice, including the interpretive methodologies that WTO
texts formally prescribe and to which panel and Appellate Body decisions
refer.
We then explain why these formal design and methodological choices
are radically insufficient for understanding WTO law. Like any dispute
settlement body confronting a legal text, WTO panels and the Appellate
Body have choices in applying the text to particular factual scenarios that
are not specifically addressed by the text. More than one WTO provision
or WTO agreement may apply to a factual situation, whether the
provisions are drafted as fairly precise rules, more open-ended standards,
or exceptions. Interpretive claims are made before panels, and the
resolution of these interpretive arguments has important consequences not
only regarding who wins or loses a particular case, but also regarding
broader systemic issues of domestic and international policy.
These consequences of treaty interpretation can be viewed in welfare
terms (regarding the efficiency and distributive consequences of a particular
interpretation) and in participatory terms (regarding the quality and extent of
participation in the decision-making processes at issue). In terms of
participation, we refer to the effect of a WTO interpretive choice on the
allocation of authority over a particular issue to different social decisionmaking processes, such as domestic political and administrative processes,
international political and administrative processes, markets, and judicial
bodies. In each of these social decision-making processes, individuals’
perspectives are directly or indirectly represented and mediated in different
ways. Regardless of how imperfect participation may be in each alternative
social decision-making process implicated by WTO texts and their
interpretation, the imperfections will not be the same, as we demonstrate
with numerous examples. The goal, of course, is to choose the best among
imperfect alternatives.
Our single analytic framework captures these two approaches to
analysis (welfare-based and participation-based). In our framework,
participation-based criteria may be understood in welfarist terms, and vice
versa. In situations where welfare consequences are difficult to calculate,
the quality and extent of participation can serve as a proxy for both
efficiency and distributive consequences. The different dynamics of
participation characterizing different institutional fora will determine the
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pursuit of a particular social goal, whether it be resource allocation
efficiency, justice as fairness, human rights, sustainable development, or
some other goal. 5 All of these goals are susceptible to inclusion in a
welfarist analysis and all are captured within our framework.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I will
present an analytical template for comparative institutional analysis of
treaty design and interpretive choice regarding dispute settlement. Part II
will describe the underlying structure of institutional choice for dispute
settlement at the WTO made by the treaty drafters. These institutional
choices shape, but do not determine, judicial interpretation, in particular
because abstract language frequently contains compromises between
conflicting positions, may be ambiguous, and, in any case, inevitably needs
to be applied to particular contexts that vary over time. Part III will then
assess the implications for social decision-making processes of the
interpretive choices made within WTO dispute settlement. It will evaluate
each of these choices in comparative welfare and participatory terms, and
provide examples from WTO case law. The Article will conclude by
explaining how this analytical framework enables greater understanding
and precision in the choice among alternative institutional processes.

I.

THE PARAMETERS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AND INTERPRETATION

New institutional economics proposes that individuals, firms, and states
select institutional devices in order to maximize welfare benefits and
minimize transaction costs and strategic costs. 6 We may understand not
only private ordering decisions, but also mechanisms for majority voting,
administrative delegation, and dispute settlement, in institutional terms.
We may also understand and compare different interpretive approaches in
these terms, although there has been much less work in this area. The
designers of international dispute settlement do not exercise extensive
control over the second-order decision-making of judicial bodies, which is
likely why new institutional economics has attended less to this

5. See Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional Choice (Two Ways), in
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 170 (Sandra S. Batie
& Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008) (“[P]articipation is the heart of key economics concepts such as
transaction costs, externalities and resource allocation efficiency. Transaction costs are the costs of
market participation. Externalities are failures of market participation where missing transactions give
rise to allocative decisions that do not reflect all costs and benefits. Resource allocation efficiency is
defined by transaction costs and violated by externalities and is, therefore, a participation-based
notion.”).
6. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001);
GREIF, supra note 3; NORTH, supra note 3; WILLIAMSON, supra note 3, at 3–22.
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phenomenon. 7 Yet, general interpretive approaches and particular
interpretive choices can be examined in terms of their costs and benefits in
social welfare terms. In a related way, they can be understood in terms of
their effect on the form and level of participation in decision-making,
which can serve as a proxy for assessing social welfare.
Our discussion of welfare effects will be relatively straightforward.
While we are normatively interested in public interest-type economic
welfare, we also recognize, descriptively, that in the international relations
context, institutions may be chosen to promote public choice-type welfare:
the welfare of government officials. 8 To the extent that the domestic
political system successfully aligns public choice-type welfare with public
interest-type welfare — that is, to the extent that the domestic political
system is responsive — these measures of welfare are congruent. We also
recognize that in the trade context, the fundamental theorem of welfare
economics will often (but not always) align national and global public
interest welfare with liberalized trade. A particular challenge arises when
trade liberalization goals interact with other social policy preferences. In
addition to considering the welfare and public choice efficiency of
interpretive choices, we must also consider the distributive effects of
interpretive choices.
While we examine welfare and public choice efficiency separately from
participation, we believe that participation can be understood in welfarist
terms, and so this separation is in important respects artificial. Welfare
analysis is based on methodological and normative individualism: Welfare
only exists in terms of the preferences of individuals. If we are to analyze
welfare from outside the mind of an individual, we must refer to revealed
preferences. In the economics of market behavior, these revealed
preferences are analyzed through purchases and sales, and equilibrium
pricing. But preferences can be inferred from other behaviors as well. One
such behavior that affects and interacts with market activity is political
participation, which involves both individuals and interest groups. In this
sense, participation is not an alternative to welfare, but rather a method of
gauging welfare through revealed preferences. In each case, individual
preferences are only imperfectly revealed in the real world because all
institutions suffer from biases and distortions, which is why comparative
institutional analysis becomes essential.

7. We review the mechanisms of control available to the designers of international dispute
settlement in Part II. By second-order decision-making, we mean judicial interpretation of a rule or
standard created by the negotiator-signatories of an agreement (i.e., the first-order decision-makers).
8. Public-interest and public-choice welfare are terms-of-art used in law and economics. See, e.g.,
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 116 (1990).
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Turning to judicial interpretation, different interpretive choices with
respect to a legal text can be viewed as affecting participation by allocating
authority over an issue to different social decision-making processes, in
which individuals are able to participate to different degrees. This variation
affects the articulation, mediation, and attainment of their preferences, and
thus of social welfare.
In addition, participation may be understood intrinsically as a
preference: Individuals may value the possibility for participation
separately from their ability to affect decisions that participation provides
them. We do not have an empirical method by which to separate this
second welfare role for participation, but we recognize that it may be
significant in many contexts. Our discussion of participation generally
recognizes that greater accountability, transparency, and opportunities for
input in different social decision-making processes will often be valued in
themselves, as well as for articulating and furthering other individual
preferences.
Within the overall category of participation, we examine the relative
degree of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy that a particular
interpretive choice entails. By transparency, we mean the extent to which the
decision-making is observable by citizens. By accountability, we mean the
extent to which decision-making can be influenced by citizens. By
legitimacy, we mean the overall extent to which citizens believe that the
interpretive choice has been structured so as to provide a fair and accurate
method by which to reflect citizen preferences.
Finally, we stress that institutions interact. Judicial interpretation is part
of this dynamic process of institutional interaction, horizontally and
vertically, across different levels of social organization. 9 In this Article, we
offer an improved means for understanding and assessing the choices
made in connection with WTO treaty drafting and judicial interpretation.
We focus attention on the importance of understanding and weighing the
relative benefits and detriments of allocating authority to alternative social
decision-making processes, ultimately affecting who decides a policy issue,
thereby affecting social welfare.

II.

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES IN TREATY DRAFTING: RULES,
STANDARDS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES, AND EX POST
SUPERVISION

WTO Members make institutional choices in writing WTO treaties.
Formally, Members have delegated the task of “clarifying” the meaning of
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 48–80 (1994);
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 266–76 (2010).
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the provisions of the WTO agreements to the WTO Appellate Body and
panels, with the instruction that such clarification be done “in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” 10 Treaty
drafters also can circumscribe judicial authority, both formally and
informally, through the precision of the text drafted, by providing rules for
the interpretive process, and by challenging, obstructing, refusing to
recognize, and potentially overruling by treaty amendment the interpretive
choices that judges make. These latter capacities can be exercised ex post
in response to interpretive choices, but they can also induce judges to
shape their interpretive choices ex ante in anticipation of Member
reactions. There may also be circumstances where judges are reluctant to
fill in what they feel are gaps in the law’s coverage, possibly in anticipation
of Members’ responses.

A.

Rules versus Standards

First, in drafting the substantive WTO agreements, Members can
circumscribe ex ante the interpretive function through the precision of the
agreed-upon text. This drafting choice is encapsulated in the distinction
between specific rules and general standards.11 The more precisely the
parties draft the text of an agreement — i.e., the more that the text
constitutes a specific rule — the less discretion is available to a WTO
panel. The more open-ended the drafting — i.e., the more that it
constitutes a general standard — the more discretion is accorded to a
panel. For example, Annex I to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties provides a detailed illustrative list of twelve
prohibited export subsidies, which in turn refers to guidelines for
determination of particular export subsidies set forth in Annexes II and
III. 12 In contrast, Article XX of the GATT, which provides exceptions for
WTO obligations, uses more open-ended language, such as the concept of
“unjustifiable discrimination.” 13
Why would negotiators choose a broader standard, implicitly delegating
more authority to dispute settlement over the text’s meaning? In some
cases, parties may choose compromise language to paper over their
differences, resulting in more open-ended text to interpret. Parties may
10. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
11. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 350
(1999).
12. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex I, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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deem it too costly to attempt to anticipate every context in which a text
might be applied, and so draft more general language for the delegated
interpreter to apply subsequently to particular situations. Where an
agreement involves multiple parties, such as the WTO agreements, the
parties are likely to resort more frequently to general standards, as opposed
to specific rules, in order to reduce the transaction costs of reaching
agreement. 14
Thus, the relative degree of specificity of treaty obligations — between
the most specific rules and the most general standards — is inversely
proportional to the extent of delegation to judges. Specificity is thus
indicative of institutional choice by treaty drafters, as between legislative
determination through rules and judicial determination based on standards.
Wherever room has been left for interpretation, we can infer that either an
explicit or an implicit institutional choice has been made: to delegate more
or less responsibility to judges.
To the extent that the WTO treaty is understood as a contract freely
entered into, we can assume that specific rules agreed among the parties
are designed to maximize welfare. Whether negotiators are maximizing
economic welfare or public choice welfare depends on the accountability
of the negotiators to their own citizens. We also can assume that a freely
concluded treaty has reasonable distributive consequences, if we ignore
strategic problems and asymmetric allocation of power. In terms of
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, these specific rules draw a
great deal from the domestic processes of negotiation and ratification: If
domestic politics are transparent, accountable, and legitimate, the rules
produced are more likely to be so as well.

14. Some law and economics scholars, writing from an economic welfare perspective, view
international agreements as “incomplete contracts” and states as delegating the interpretation of these
contracts to international tribunals because it is less costly to them than to negotiate more explicit
terms up front. See Henrik Horn et al., Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts, 100 AM.
ECON. REV. 394, 394 (2010) (“We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is
costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. . . . We argue that taking
contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain . . . key features of real trade agreements.”);
Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the
World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S180–81 (2002) (“The point of departure is the
proposition that the WTO agreements are, in effect, contracts among the political actors who
negotiated and signed them. As with all contracts, it is in the interest of the signatories to maximize
the joint gains from trade, that is, to enable the signatories to attain their Pareto frontier. . . . [W]e will
argue that the WTO provisions respecting renegotiation and the settlement of disputes over breach
of obligations are carefully designed to facilitate efficient adjustments to unanticipated
circumstances.”); Wilfred J. Ethier, Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements (Penn Inst. for
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
01-021,
2001),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=273212 (“This paper interprets dispute settlement
procedures and punishments as responses to the fact that trade agreements are incomplete
contracts.”).
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Broader standards, on the other hand, raise greater issues. We assume
that, given the costs of specification, it was more efficient (either from a
welfare or from a public choice perspective, or both) to establish
standards, but it is less clear that the actual application of the standard by a
judge will meet these efficiency criteria. 15 Further, the application of
standards may seem lacking in transparency, accountability, and legitimacy
because unelected judges are making the ultimate decision. It seems easy
for critics to forget that the allocation of authority to judges under
standards derives from the same type of political processes that produce
specific rules. The delegation of authority to less participatory judicial
processes nonetheless can be vulnerable to criticism, even where the initial
delegation itself seems satisfactory from a participatory standpoint, and
even where the delegation may be justifiable in welfare terms.

B.

Delegation to Other International Organizations or Processes

Second, while (as discussed below) the WTO dispute settlement process
generally declines to apply or to determine rights and duties under nonWTO substantive international law, in certain cases, the drafters of WTO
texts have specifically incorporated non-WTO international law by
reference. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), for example, incorporates by
reference portions of the following treaties: the Paris Convention (on
industrial property), the Berne Convention (on copyrights), the Rome
Convention (on performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters), and
the Washington Treaty (on integrated circuits). 16
The drafters have also partially incorporated into WTO texts the
decisions of other international bodies, even when those decisions are
made subsequently and are voluntary under the rules of those other
bodies, and thus do not necessarily achieve the status of international law.
Certain provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
(SPS Agreement) are examples of the latter alternative, as they refer to
15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 532–33 (6th ed. 2003).
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1.3, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(“Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of other
Members. (1) In respect of the relevant intellectual property right, the nationals of other Members
shall be understood as those natural or legal persons that would meet the criteria for eligibility for
protection provided for in the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome
Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, were all
Members of the WTO members of those conventions. (2) Any Member availing itself of the
possibilities provided in paragraph 3 of Article 5 or paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Rome Convention
shall make a notification as foreseen in those provisions to the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights.”).
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international standards adopted through particular international standardsetting bodies. 17 Members are required to base their domestic standards on
these international ones, subject to certain exceptions.
There are three international organizations expressly recognized by the
SPS Agreement for the adoption of harmonized international food, plant,
and animal health protection standards: the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, the International Plant Protection Committee (IPPC), and
the International Office of Epizootics (OIE). 18 The organizational rules of
these three bodies provide for the adoption of standards by either a simple
majority vote (for food and animal health standards under the Codex
Alimentarius Commission and OIE) or a two-thirds majority vote (for
plant protection standards under the IPPC). 19 WTO Member regulations
that implement these international standards are presumed to be legal
under the SPS Agreement. 20 Although the TBT Agreement does not
expressly reference particular bodies as international standard-setting
bodies, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires that Members use
“relevant international standards” “as a basis for” their technical
regulations, subject to certain exceptions. 21 These standards are often
adopted by hybrid public-private bodies, such as the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). 22
The fact that a “legislative” act, in connection with sanitary and
phytosanitary standards, and to a lesser extent other product standards,
takes place outside the WTO imparts some interesting features. First, it can
provide the WTO a degree of insulation from criticism with respect to
legitimacy, since the decision regarding the appropriate standard is made
through another political process. Second, it provides a legislative device
that may evade the need for consensus within the WTO. This avoidance of
consensus may raise legitimacy challenges.23 Codex Alimentarius and other
17. See Tim Büthe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority in
the SPS Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 219 (2008).
18. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 12(3), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493
[hereinafter SPS Agreement].
19. See MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 214 (2009).
20. SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 3.2 (“Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to
international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of
this Agreement and of GATT 1994.”).
21. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
22. See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of
Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1 (2003) (describing and analyzing the International Organization for
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission).
23. Similarly, Annex 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
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standard-setters can provide opportunities for less rigorous voting
requirements for adoption of international rules. 24 Third, this structure
provides an opportunity for subject-matter specialists, as opposed to trade
officials, to take the lead role in formulating the relevant standards.
From the perspective of economic welfare, this type of delegation to
international standard-setting bodies may reduce the possibility for
protectionist formulation of national standards, and may thereby promote
economic efficiency. Efficiency also may be enhanced by the expertise
deployed by these bodies. Nonetheless, these decision-making processes
are also subject to capture by certain interests, such as large industrial
interests, which has prompted criticism. 25 Because of the imperfections in
transparency and accountability that may characterize these standardsetting bodies, granting significant authority to the standards adopted by
them can raise legitimacy concerns.
Reference by WTO bodies to these externally produced standards often
displaces the type of judicial scrutiny that might otherwise be applied to
national standards regarding, for instance, their scientific or nondiscriminatory basis. So it is useful to examine the efficiency and
participation characteristics of these references to international bodies in
comparison to other institutional alternatives, such as judicial
determination. In Part III below, we discuss the interpretation by panels
and the Appellate Body of references to rules established by international
standard-setting bodies, while in this subsection we have discussed the
initial institutional choice by treaty authors to specify these references.

C.

Specifying Interpretive Rules

Third, states may choose to instruct judges on how to exercise their
authority, or they may leave the choice over interpretive rules to the
judges. WTO Members provided instructions regarding interpretation.
Formally, the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or

Agreement) grants to a subset of WTO Members the ability to decide which export credit practices
will not be considered export subsidies, and thus will be permitted by the agreement. Controversially,
this subset of Members consists solely of OECD Members. Item K of Annex 1 provides that “if a
Member is a party to an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve
original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking
which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest
rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with
those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.” SCM
Agreement, supra note 12, Annex 1. Such delegation raises legitimacy issues because a subset of
Members can create rules, albeit of limited scope, affecting the entire WTO membership.
24. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 34.
25. Id. at 3.
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DSU) instructs panels to interpret texts “in accordance with the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law.” 26
The customary rules of interpretation have been codified in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 27 and
the Appellate Body referenced the VCLT in sixty-two of its first ninety-six
decisions (65%), starting with its first decision in United States–Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline in April 1996. 28 Article 31.1 provides
that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.” 29 Not surprisingly, panels and
the Appellate Body frequently commence their interpretations by
examining the “ordinary meaning” of the text, often citing dictionaries
regarding that meaning. A search of the first ninety-six rulings of the
Appellate Body found that a dictionary was cited in sixty-seven decisions
regarding the “ordinary meaning” of a term (constituting 70% of these
Appellate Body rulings). While the VCLT is by no means a detailed guide
to interpretation, it provides at least some circumscription of the
interpretative process.
Article 31.2 delineates the “context” to be referenced in interpreting a
treaty provision. It defines “context” to include, first, the text of the
agreement, including its preamble and annexes; second, “any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty”; and third, “any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.” 30 In other words, the VCLT circumscribes the meaning of
“context,” which does not, by its terms, encompass factual, social, or
historical context. The Appellate Body nonetheless has stated that
interpretation under Article 31 is “a holistic exercise that should not be
mechanically subdivided into rigid components,” such that a panel may
consider particular surrounding factual circumstances, whether “under the
rubric of ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘in the light of its context.’” 31
Articles 31(3) and 32, moreover, further broaden the interpretive
enterprise to take into account other sources. Article 31(3) requires
interpreters to consider:
26. DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.2.
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
28. Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
29. VCLT, supra note 27, art. 31.1.
30. Id. art. 31.2.
31. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken
Cuts, ¶ 176, WT/DS269/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005).
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(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.32
This last provision raises the question of the role of non-WTO
international law in interpretation, including customary international law
and other international treaties. Finally, Article 32 provides that a dispute
settlement panel may refer to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31,
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 33
The guidance that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT provide to treaty
interpreters, and the specific reference to “customary rules of
interpretation of public international law” in Article 3.2 of the DSU,
constitute an institutional choice by the treaty drafters. The negotiators of
the DSU chose to avoid immediate reference to the travaux préparatoires
(preparatory work) of WTO treaties, but rather to require interpreters to
focus first on text. This focus on text may be understood from a welfare
perspective, and from a participation perspective in light of the fact that all
treaties, like all contracts, are incomplete.
From a welfare perspective, we assume (as with private contracts) that
freely agreed treaty provisions are designed by the parties to maximize
their joint welfare. If so, then an interpretive rule that focuses on text can
be viewed as enhancing Member welfare by empowering the choices of
WTO Members and constraining the discretion of judges. Of course, there
are important limits to the assumption underlying this analysis, especially
in the WTO context, because strategic problems and power asymmetries
may affect the parties’ ability to formulate welfare-maximizing treaty
provisions. Second, the parties to the treaty may be maximizing political
welfare, in a public choice sense, as opposed to public interest welfare. In
that case, the social welfare arising from the drafting choice will depend on

32. VCLT, supra note 27, art. 31(3).
33. Id. art. 32.
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the relative congruence between the political welfare of government
officials and national and global social welfare.
From a participation perspective, the focus on text can be viewed as an
instruction to give primacy to the political branches that formulated the
treaty, rather than to the judicial process. The focus on text, from this
perspective, constitutes a decision to attempt to retain relative authority
within the legislative process, as opposed to transferring greater authority
to the judiciary. Nonetheless, by limiting the use of travaux préparatoires,
treaty negotiators are also reducing their ability to have their intent, as
opposed to their words, be the primary reference point in interpretation.
Alternatively, this choice of interpretive methodology might be understood
in terms of allocating relative authority between legislatures and executives
in national political processes. By focusing on text, parliaments or other
bodies that approve international agreements have greater certainty
regarding the meaning of the treaty terms that they have approved. It is the
text that they approved that has primacy, not the intent of negotiators
reflected in the travaux préparatoires, which may or may not reflect the
legislature’s intent. The focus on text, and not travaux préparatoires, in
interpreting WTO agreements, in other words, can be viewed in terms of
its indirect impact on participation, raising the issues of relative
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, as this textual focus can
empower national legislatures in relation to both national negotiators and
international adjudicators, compared to other alternatives.
WTO Members have also attempted to constrain treaty interpretation
of particular provisions by assigning particular interpretive rules to them.
For instance, Article 17.6 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement provides
for a degree of deference to national interpretation of law in WTO
challenges to anti-dumping decisions made by domestic authorities. 34
Article 17.6 (ii) provides that “[w]here the panel finds that a relevant
provision of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to
be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations.” 35 The United States pushed for this rule in
order to retain greater discretion in applying U.S. anti-dumping regulations
under WTO rules. 36 In practice, however, many commentators believe that
34. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 art. 17.6, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr.
15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
35. Id.
36. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 199–200 (1996) (describing negotiations over
Art. 17.6); Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The WTO’s First Two and a Half Years of Dispute
Resolution, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 481, 636 (1998) (“The United States also insisted on an
arguably different standard of review of legal interpretations in the anti-dumping and countervailing
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the Appellate Body has been unconstrained by this interpretive rule, paying
it no more than lip service when interpreting the meaning of the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 37

D.

Retaining a Veto

Fourth, even after they have delegated interpretive authority, WTO
Members can exercise some formal ex post oversight of the interpretation
of WTO texts. However, they retain fewer checks on the judicial
interpreter than under the predecessor regime, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under the GATT, to form a panel required a
consensus decision of all GATT Contracting Parties. 38 Thus, any party,
including the respondent, could block the panel’s formation. Likewise,
adoption of the panel ruling required consensus, so that any GATT
Contracting Party, including the losing party, could block the ruling and
thus its interpretive implications. 39
The DSU, however, created a “reverse consensus” rule so that the
formation of a panel or the adoption of a panel ruling can only be blocked
if no WTO Member objects to blocking such formation or adoption,
including, respectively, the respondent and winning party. 40 This rule
effectively makes WTO dispute settlement automatic and delegates greater
powers of interpretation to WTO panels and the Appellate Body. The
formal adoption of an Appellate Body or panel ruling by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body is, as a result, pro forma.
WTO Members still can amend the texts where they disagree with the
interpretation made by a WTO panel or the Appellate Body, constituting a
kind of “legislative veto.” Amending texts, however, can be quite difficult,
even in domestic legal systems with legislatures where approval is by
duty area.”).
37. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of
Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 112–13 (2002) (stating that “the
special standard of review has had virtually no impact on the review of national anti-dumping
measures by the WTO”); Isabelle Van Damme, Ninth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview, 13 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 497, 508–09 (2010) (describing ineffectiveness of Article 17.6).
38. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT & THE WTO 123 (2000); Tom
Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 650 (2005)
(noting that formation of panels under GATT required consensus).
39. For example, shortly before the WTO’s formation, the United States blocked the adoption of
controversial GATT decisions regarding the relationship of environmental protection measures and
trade commitments in the two tuna-dolphin cases. Report of the Panel, United States–Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna (June 16, 1994), GATT/DS29/R (unadopted); Report of the Panel, United States–
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 155 (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (unadopted)
[hereinafter Tuna–Dolphin I Panel Report].
40. John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:
Obligation to Comply Or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 114 (2004) (describing “reverse
consensus” mechanism).
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simple majority. 41 In the WTO context, it is particularly difficult given that
the agreements are changed only with the consensus of the WTO
membership, which included 153 Members as of June 2011. 42 Although
the formal WTO rules provide for amendment or formal interpretation by
Members with less than a consensus vote, these voting rules have not been
used in practice.43 The result, from an institutional perspective, is again
considerable delegation of interpretive authority to WTO panels and the
Appellate Body. Because of the prevailing norm of decision-making by
consensus, the WTO political/legislative system, in contrast to its judicial
system, is relatively inflexible and weak.44
The possibility of legislative reversal, if it were practically effective,
would derivatively display some of the same efficiency and participation
characteristics as the original treaty-making. It would involve direct action
by negotiators, with whatever efficiency, transparency, accountability, and
legitimacy characteristics appertain to such action.

E.

Interpretive Communities and Member Defiance

Fifth, the WTO Appellate Body and panels also face non-formal
constraints that inform their interpretive choices regarding WTO texts.
Most importantly, the discretion of the Appellate Body and panels is
cabined in terms of the accepted meaning of the text within a larger
interpretive community that includes (first) the Members themselves, and
in particular the most active users of the DSU, which tend to be the largest
traders, and (second and more broadly) business and civil society

41. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1982) (noting that it is
generally harder to amend statutes than to enact them initially); James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21–26
(1994) (discussing obstacles to moving legislation through Congress).
42. WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
(stating that WTO has 153 members) (last visited June 1, 2011).
43. Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO provides for a general rule
on WTO decision-making that “except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at
by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting,” and, in such a case, by a simple majority
of the votes cast. Article X provides for a specific rule on amendments, providing for a two-thirds
majority vote, subject to some complications depending on whether an amendment would alter
substantive rights and obligations. Articles IX:2 and IX:3 provide respectively for a three-fourths
majority vote for authoritative interpretations of the texts and for the waiver of any obligations of a
member. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. IX & X, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see also Theodore R. Posner & Timothy M. Reif, Homage to a Bull Moose:
Applying Lessons of History to Meet the Challenges of Globalization, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 481, 504–05
(2000).
44. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Are WTO Decision-Making Procedures
Adequate for Making, Revising, and Implementing Worldwide and ‘Plurilateral’ Rules?, in REFORMING THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 498,
516–19 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005).
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organizations, social movements, academics, and so forth. 45 In addition, a
panel can anticipate the likely WTO Member reactions to its interpretive
choice. In fact, Article 3.4 of the DSU arguably instructs a panel to
consider Member responses by requiring that a panel’s rulings “shall be
aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance
with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the
covered agreements.” 46 WTO law is a social ordering and transactionfacilitating mechanism and, in particular, a mechanism for managing
ongoing trade relations of Members over time. WTO panelists and
Appellate Body members enhance their authority and legitimacy, and thus
their status, if they promote this basic function. 47
If a Member refuses to comply with a decision, and if such defiance
becomes relatively systematic, the authority of the Appellate Body and
WTO panels can be undermined. A Member’s defiance is strengthened if
its arguments regarding interpretation are supported by a broader
community of interpreters. WTO panels and the Appellate Body can
anticipate these responses, recursively affecting their interpretive choices.
In this way, WTO judicial decision-making can be viewed as
“interdependent” with other decision-making processes, such as political
processes, as well as with broader social processes involving interpretive
communities.48

III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE CHOICE WITHIN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AS INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Legal texts are always indeterminate at some level, which is why their
meaning is intensely debated and reasonable interpreters often disagree.
Under all interpretive theories and methodologies, there are inevitably
45. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004) (arguing that evaluation of the WTO dispute
settlement system should take into account the extent to which the Appellate Body is constrained by
international legal discourse, politics, and constitutional structure). See generally STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) (providing a constructivist approach to interpretation and
interpretive communities); Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument,
14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 443–44 (2003) (discussing the concept of interpretive communities in
international law).
46. DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.4.
47. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 45. See generally Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (presenting an
economic theory of the behavior of appellate judges).
48. For a related perspective, see Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 633; see also LON L. FULLER,
ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968) (“The interpretation of statutes is, then, not simply a process of
drawing out of the statute what its maker put into it but is also in part, and in varying degrees, a
process of adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to which it is to be
applied.”).
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disagreements regarding a WTO text’s meaning. What, for example, is the
meaning of “like product” in the various agreements? The Appellate Body
has found that it varies depending on the context, writing in the Japan–
Alcoholic Beverages case that:
[t]he concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of
an accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in
different places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are
applied . . . [in relation to] the context and the circumstances that
prevail in any given case . . . . 49
Similarly, what is the meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” in Article
XX of the GATT? The Appellate Body said that the meaning of the term
“natural resources” is “not ‘static’ . . . but is rather ‘by definition,
evolutionary.’” 50 What if two provisions could apply, potentially leading to
different results, with one setting forth a more general standard and the
other a more specific rule? In the WTO anti-dumping zeroing cases
against the United States, for example, a series of dispute settlement panels
agreed with the United States that the practice of zeroing was permitted in
certain circumstances by the detailed wording of subsections of Article 2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 51 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body has
maintained that the general provision of Article 2.4 of that agreement,
which provides that “[a] fair comparison shall be made between the export
price and the normal value,” effectively prohibits the use of zeroing. 52
49. Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, at 21 (Oct. 4,
1996) [hereinafter Japan–Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report].
50. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶
130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report]
(emphasis added). The Appellate Body has also held that the words “must be read . . . in the light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment.” Id. ¶ 129. See also Panel Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.461, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) (“[T]he content of these
concepts [of public morals and public order] can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of
factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.”).
51. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, WTO Agreement, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter GATT]. The United
States argued that the dumping margin permitted by Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement “can
be interpreted as applying on a transaction-specific basis.” Appellate Body Report, United States–Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 128, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr.
18, 2006); see also Panel Report, United States–Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶
7.70, WT/DS344/R (Dec. 20, 2007) (“[T]he United States argues that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
cannot be interpreted to include a general prohibition on zeroing in all contexts.”). “Zeroing” is a
method of determining the margin of dumping that compares the prices of individual export
transactions against weighted average normal values and treats as zero the results of comparisons
where the export price exceeds the weighted average normal value, instead of using the resulting
negative dumping margin to reduce the margin of dumping.
52. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States–Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber
from Canada, ¶ 138, WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006) (“The term ‘fair’ is generally understood to
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In short, the analysis of a text’s “ordinary meaning” can only get an
interpreter so far. In some cases, that meaning is generally settled among
all affected parties, which makes that case “easy.” In many cases, however,
the meaning of a particular provision, at times in light of other provisions
in the WTO texts and other international law, may be highly contested as
applied to different factual contexts. What does a panel do in such cases?
Although constrained in the interpretation of WTO texts, the Appellate
Body and panels retain important interpretive choices, and these choices
implicate the operation of other social decision-making processes, and
ultimately affect social welfare.
This section examines how WTO panels and the Appellate Body make
interpretive decisions that can effectively delegate responsibility to
different social decision-making processes, including to national political
and administrative processes; WTO political bodies; other international
organizations with specific functional mandates, such as standard-setting
organizations; international market processes (by stringently reviewing and
ruling against national decisions that adversely affect imports); and the
dispute settlement panels themselves, which are supported by the WTO
secretariat (by engaging in judicial balancing and process-based review). In
making these institutional choices, the Appellate Body and panels can reallocate decision-making authority over the issues at stake, including by
delegating the determination of some underlying factual issues in disputes
to experts having technical expertise, such as scientists and economists.
These “delegations” and “allocations” of authority are, of course, not
static. Rather, they should be viewed as part of ongoing processes of
institutional interaction taking place over time regarding the meaning and
application of the text. 53
Each of these interpretive choices, with its institutional implications, has
different effects on welfare and participation. We look at each choice
individually and comparatively in terms of its welfare, distributive, and
participation implications, giving examples in each case from WTO case
law. None of these institutional choices is perfect from the perspectives of
social welfare maximization, distributive fairness, or the direct or indirect
participation in decision-making of affected stakeholders. Under each
alternative, stakeholder positions will be reflected and affected in different
ways. Different interpretive choices can thus be analyzed using a

connote impartiality, even-handedness, or lack of bias. For the reasons stated below, we consider that
the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology is difficult to
reconcile with the notions of impartiality, even-handedness, and lack of bias reflected in the ‘fair
comparison’ requirement in Article 2.4.”).
53. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9; and ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 272 (discussing
institutional dynamism and the hydraulics of institutional interactions).
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comparative institutional analytic method that focuses on the relative
implications of interpretive choices for welfare and participation.

A.

Allocation of Decision-Making to WTO Political Processes, or to Subsets of
WTO Members

The allocation of authority within the WTO can be evaluated in terms
of horizontal and vertical allocations of powers, including the relationships
among legislative, executive, and adjudicative institutions over time. While
the WTO’s executive function is handled largely by the WTO secretariat
and is relatively limited, 54 the relationship between adjudication and
legislation — between the judicial branch and the legislative branch — is
of particular interest. The legislative branch, understood here as the
Members in their treaty-making and treaty-oversight capacity, is
theoretically omnipotent, but it only exercises its power after long rounds
of negotiations, or in very limited and infrequent amendments and
interpretive understandings. Thus, the interpretive choices of the Appellate
Body and panels in the WTO dispute settlement system can easily affect
the allocation of powers among decision-making processes.
As we showed in Part II, the practice of voting by consensus makes it
effectively impossible for Members to override an Appellate Body or panel
decision. This difficulty affects the horizontal allocation of powers set up
by the WTO agreements. These agreements provide for specific types of
decision-making by the parties and delegate this authority to certain
committees within the WTO, such as the Committee on Balance of
Payments and the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. 55 Although
still subject to the constraint of voting by consensus, the extensive WTO
committee system represents a form of political decision-making that can
be used to elaborate upon and guide the meaning of texts, and help

54. See Gregory Shaffer, The Role of the WTO Director-General and Secretariat, 4 WORLD TRADE REV.
429 (2005).
55. Regarding balance of payments, see Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1538 (supplementing the GATT and revising
procedures for Committee action regarding measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes);
Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 205–09 (1980) (describing procedures for Committee action regarding measures taken
for balance-of-payments purposes); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XII and XVIII,
Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 194–254 (describing control of measures taken for balance of
payments purposes). Regarding regional trade agreements, see World Trade Organization, General
Council, Decision of 6 February 1996, WT/L/127 (1996), http://tinyurl.com/4x8emfk (creating the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements); Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161 (1994)
(modifying GATT art. XXIV); GATT, supra note 51, at 268–72 (relating to control of customs
agreements and free trade agreements among GATT members).
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mediate disputes before they lead to full litigation. 56 In one anti-dumping
case, for example, a dispute settlement panel referenced a recommendation
of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices in 2000 as providing the
applicable norm to guide interpretation. 57 Moreover, approximately
seventy-five other international organizations hold observer status within
the WTO, and WTO secretariat members attend the meetings of many of
these international organizations on a reciprocal basis. 58 These
arrangements enable the secretariat and the trade representatives of the
Members to be aware of developments in other areas of international law,
and permit the secretariats and state representatives of other international
organizations to be aware of the implications of WTO law for their
respective areas.
These political processes within WTO committees, however, have yet
to prevent the dispute settlement system from exercising jurisdiction in
matters falling within the committee’s areas of concern. For example, the
Appellate Body has found that specific WTO treaty provisions confirm the
availability of dispute settlement regarding the issues of whether a balance
of payments exception or customs union exists, and it thus has interpreted
and enforced these provisions. 59 The specific assignment of decisionmaking authority to these political bodies has therefore not stopped the
Appellate Body from issuing rulings over claims in these areas. Thus far,
the Appellate Body has generally declined to recognize a form of “political
question” doctrine pursuant to which it will defer questions to the WTO’s
political branches and refrain from ruling on particular WTO claims, at
least in cases where it finds that the agreement at issue specifically
56. Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575,
586 (2009) (stating the ways in which WTO committees are “involved in the gradual development of
shared norms”); id. at 587–88 (describing how committee work can lead to the avoidance of formal
dispute mechanisms).
57. See Panel Report, European Communities–Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe
Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R (Mar. 7, 2003) ¶ 7.321 & n.272; see also Richard Stewart & Michelle
Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organization and Global Administrative Law, in CHRISTIAN
JOERGES & ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE
GOVERNANCE, AND SOCIAL REGULATION 457–94 (2d ed. 2011).
58. See International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited June 1, 2011); see
also Steve Charnovitz, International Standards and the WTO (The George Washington University Law
School Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 133, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=694346.
59. Appellate Body Report, India–Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, ¶ 87, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999) (“Any doubts that may have existed in the
past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII were available for disputes
relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been removed by the second sentence of footnote 1
to the BOP Understanding . . . .”); see also Panel Report, Turkey–Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, ¶ 9.50–.51, WT/DS34/AB/R, (May 31, 1999) (“We understand from the wording of
paragraph 12 of the WTO Understanding on Article XXIV, that panels have jurisdiction to examine
‘any matters “arising from” the application of those provisions of Article XXIV.’”).
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confirms the availability of dispute settlement.60 Nor has it recognized a
concept of non liquet, pursuant to which it would refuse to issue a ruling
where it finds that existing WTO law does not cover an issue. 61 As a result,
WTO dispute settlement is available to interpret and enforce WTO
provisions even where the application of these provisions is also expressly
assigned to political decision-making or there is an alleged “gap” in the
law. Importantly, the practice of voting by consensus has prevented
political decision-making in these cases, so that the judicial process can be
viewed as deciding them by default.
Through interpretation, the Appellate Body and panels can implicitly
allocate decision-making to other political processes by signaling that they
will take into account other agreements between the parties to a dispute.
This issue arose, for instance, in the United States–Shrimp case. There, the
Appellate Body’s report noted that the United States had successfully
negotiated an Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles, which demonstrated that “multilateral
procedures [were] available and feasible.” 62 The Appellate Body found that
the United States never seriously attempted to negotiate a similar
agreement with the four Asian complainants. In this way, in the particular
context of the chapeau (introductory paragraph) of Article XX of the
GATT, the Appellate Body tried to foster an ad hoc political approach by
requiring the United States to attempt to negotiate harmonized substantive
rules before implementing a ban that could trigger a dispute before the
WTO judicial process. When Malaysia subsequently challenged the United
States for failing to reach a negotiated settlement through a multilateral
process, the Appellate Body held that the United States only needed to
engage in good-faith negotiations, but was not required to conclude an
agreement. 63
60. Cf. Jeffrey Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 757–58 (1999)
(calling for use of a political question doctrine).
61. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 45, at 258 (“Also at the restrained end of the continuum, various
customary doctrines counsel abstention in dealing with a gap in the law. Some would invoke the
doctrine of non liquet (which means ‘it is not clear’) if the law does not permit deciding a case one way
or the other. According to that view, there are gaps in international law and it is not the place of
courts to fill those gaps as they are not legislative organs; thus, in such cases courts should declare non
liquet.”); see also Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 861, 874–75 (2004) (describing the potential use of non liquet in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings); Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, WTO Dispute Settlement in the Field of Anti-Dumping
Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 259, 271 (1998) (noting an argument that unregulated areas could be
considered non liquet, allowing panels and the Appellate Body to refuse jurisdiction).
62. United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶¶ 166–70.
63. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products:
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶¶ 122–23, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
(“Requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded by the United States in order to avoid ‘arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination’ in applying its measure would mean that any country party to the
negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO Member or not, would have, in effect, a veto
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In other words, in the United States–Shrimp case, the Appellate Body
implicitly accepted the possibility that a subset of Members themselves
might define, in its words, the “line of equilibrium” between regulatory
restrictions and liberalized trade under the chapeau of Article XX. 64 This
decision can be viewed as setting a factual standard as to what types of
national efforts will satisfy the requirements of the chapeau, while also redelegating to subsets of Members implicated in a dispute the authority to
decide on an arrangement pursuant to which the national trade restrictive
measure would be able to meet Article XX requirements. Similarly, on the
issue of opening hearings to the public (which have traditionally been
closed), panels and the Appellate Body have chosen to defer to the
decision of the litigating states. 65 This allocation of authority is,
nonetheless, significantly more circumscribed, and more provisionspecific, than allowing subsets of Members to vary their obligations inter se,
which does not appear to be formally permitted by the WTO charter.
It is impossible to evaluate this institutional choice of allocating
authority to a subset of Members from the standpoint of economic welfare
without addressing the competing priorities held by the affected parties,
because this type of decision involves commensuration between diverse
values. From the standpoint of political efficiency, in a public choice sense,
such sub-multilateral arrangements are likely to be efficient, so long as they
do not give rise to negative externalities upon the governments of other
states. Similarly, if the arrangements do not result in negative externalities
for other constituencies, then the arrangements can be viewed as more
appropriate from a participatory perspective, again depending on the
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the domestic politics of the
subset of Members. By virtue of the political consensus among the
contending states, concerns regarding both efficiency and participation are
to some extent addressed. A number of commentators have thus
contended that such international political processes should be
over whether the United States could fulfill its WTO obligations.”).
64. United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶ 170 (“[T]he parties to the InterAmerican Convention together marked out the equilibrium line”). See also id. ¶ 159. The obligation to
negotiate was rejected by the Appellate Body in the Gambling case, in the context of the subheadings
of Article XIV of GATS — in a provision equivalent to the necessity requirement of Article XX(b)
of GATT. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter United States–Gambling Appellate
Body Report].
65. See Panel Report, Canada–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute,
¶¶ 7.41–7.51, WT/DS321/R (Mar. 31, 2008). This decision was subsequently modified by the
Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–
Hormones Dispute, Annex IV–Procedural Ruling of July 10 to Allow Public Observation of the Oral
Hearing, ¶ 11, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) (“For these reasons, the Division authorizes the
public observation of the oral hearing in these proceedings on the terms set out below.”) [hereinafter
United States–Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report].
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institutionalized within the WTO, 66 or outside of and in collaboration with
it. 67 However, it is likely that a rule of consensus or unanimity could often
result in a minority blocking what might otherwise be a more efficient
outcome, or an outcome that would enhance stakeholder participation.
Overall, delegation of decision-making authority to an international
political process is, like other institutional alternatives, subject to trade-offs
from the standpoints of welfare and participation. Even if international
political processes were made more robust, they would still be subject to
biases arising from resource and power imbalances, collective action
problems, and general citizen apathy toward distant fora. The
bureaucracies of large, wealthy countries have greater resources, and larger,
more experienced staffs. Interest groups from these countries are more
likely than interest groups from developing countries to have the funding
needed to represent their views at the international level. The development
of international political governance mechanisms can nonetheless provide
a focal point for political negotiations that can make the conflicting norms,
priorities, and interests at stake in trade-social policy conflicts more
transparent, potentially enhancing global welfare. 68 By bringing developing
country perspectives that might otherwise be suppressed in a litigation
context to the fore, political bargaining might facilitate targeted financial
transfers that would be more equitable and efficient in addressing
environmental and development goals. 69 Yet, political bargaining also
intensifies the role of political leverage, and can provide better
opportunities for strong states to prevail over the interests of weaker ones
in the resolution of disputes.

B.

Recognition of Other International Political Processes through Taking
Account of Other International Law

One way for the judicial process to allocate authority to other political
processes is through its treatment of other (non-WTO) international law.
The question of what law is to be applied and interpreted in WTO dispute
settlement raises treaty design and interpretive questions that have
significant institutional implications. Application of, or reference to, nonWTO international law can be viewed as a way of effectively delegating
decision-making authority to the non-WTO source institution, which may
operate under a different framework of norms (such as environmental,
66. Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 305 (2004).
67. See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
239–41 (1994) (advocating creation of a Global Environmental Organization); Gregory C. Shaffer,
The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of
Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
68. Shaffer , supra note 67, at 13.
69. Id. at 89–92.
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human rights, or labor protection), and involve the participation of
different actors. The drafters of the WTO agreements made certain
choices clear, but left others open. Some of these have been raised in
WTO disputes and have also been the subject of considerable academic
commentary.70
It is clear and undisputed that when states agreed in the Uruguay Round
to the DSU, they did not create a court of general jurisdiction. As a result,
only claims based on WTO law may be adjudicated under the DSU. 71 This
choice of international treaty design is certainly an important institutional
one: The creation of a court capable of interpreting and applying claims
under WTO law, but not authorized to entertain claims under other
international law, empowers certain institutions, laws, and values in
relation to others.
Yet, there may be circumstances in which non-WTO law is relevant to a
claim based on WTO law, raising questions of interpretive choice having
institutional implications. For example, it may be that a multilateral
environmental treaty or a customary rule of human rights law could be
invoked as a defense to a WTO obligation. Under certain circumstances, a
norm of customary international law (including but not limited to jus cogens)
or another international treaty provision could trump a claim under WTO
law, should the two conflict, and should the other norm (such as a jus cogens
norm) occupy a superior hierarchical position. Non-WTO rules of
international law obviously may apply to state conduct. It is less clear
whether, when states agreed to the DSU, they intended for panels and the
Appellate Body to apply non-WTO international law. Panels and the
Appellate Body are not courts of general jurisdiction, but what is the law
that they are assigned to interpret and apply?
The DSU does not explicitly specify the body of applicable law that
WTO adjudicators are assigned to interpret and apply, although it does
provide that the mandate to panels and the Appellate Body is “to clarify
the existing provisions of the [WTO covered agreements],” which are
listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU. 72 The Appellate Body has said clearly
that WTO adjudicators are not empowered to interpret non-WTO
international law for purposes of applying non-WTO international law. In
the Mexico–Soft Drinks case, the Appellate Body stated that it would be
inappropriate for a panel to make a determination as to whether the
United States had acted inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations. 73 It
70. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Jurisdiction in WTO Dispute Settlement, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005).
71. Id.
72. DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.2.
73. Appellate Body Report, Mexico–Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 56,
WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1788244

2011]

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AT THE WTO

129

declined to accept “Mexico’s interpretation[, which] would imply that the
WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and
obligations outside the covered agreements.” 74 While the Appellate Body
determined that it could not “determine rights and duties outside the
covered agreements,” it did not explicitly state that it could not give effect
to rights and duties outside the covered agreements in assessing claims
based on WTO law.
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT specifically instructs that interpreters shall
consider “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.” In the EC–Biotech case, the panel found it sensible
“to interpret Article 31(3)(c) as requiring consideration of those rules of
international law which are applicable in the relations between all parties to
the treaty which is being interpreted.” 75 Therefore, only those international
legal rules to which all Members are party, such as general customary
international law or treaties that include all Members, would be required to
be taken into account. The panel observed that “[r]equiring that a treaty be
interpreted in the light of other rules of international law which bind the
States parties to the treaty ensures or enhances the consistency of the rules
of international law applicable to these States and thus contributes to
avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules.” 76 The panel thus made an
institutional choice to limit the authority of other international political
processes, a decision that was later criticized in an International Law
Commission report. 77 In the EC–Biotech case, since the complainants (as
well as many other Members) had not ratified the Biosafety Protocol, the
panel found that VCLT Article 31(3)(c) did not require it to take into
account the Biosafety Protocol when interpreting the WTO treaty. 78
74. Id.
75. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, ¶ 7.70, WT/DS291/R, (Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EC–Biotech Panel Report].
76. Id.
77. See Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 450, 472, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr.
13, 2006) (“The panel buys what it calls the ‘consistency’ of its interpretation of the WTO Treaty at
the cost of the consistency of the multilateral treaty system as a whole. It aims to mitigate this
consequence by accepting that other treaties may nevertheless be taken into account as facts
elucidating the ordinary meaning of certain terms in the relevant WTO treaty. This is of course
always possible and, as pointed out above, has been done in the past as well. However, taking ‘other
treaties’ into account as evidence of ‘ordinary meaning’ appears a rather contrived way of preventing
the ‘clinical isolation’ as emphasized by the Appellate Body. . . . A better solution is to permit
reference to another treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty. . . .
In addition, it might also be useful to take into account the extent to which that other treaty relied
upon can be said to have been ‘implicitly’ accepted or at least tolerated by the other parties ‘in the
sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or understanding of all
members as to the meaning of the . . . term concerned’.”).
78. Argentina and Canada had signed the Biosafety Protocol but not ratified it, while the United
States had not signed it. Argentina and Canada had signed and ratified the underlying Convention on
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The Panel in the EC–Biotech case nonetheless left open the possibility
that a panel would have discretion to take into account another international
treaty where the parties to the dispute had each ratified that other treaty.79
In addition, it recognized that other rules of international law might
inform the interpretation of the meaning of the WTO text as applied to a
particular factual context, rather than as independent rules of applicable
law. The Appellate Body in the early United States–Gasoline report
memorably wrote that the GATT “is not to be read in clinical isolation
from public international law.” 80 Similarly, in the United States–Shrimp case,
the Appellate Body referred to “modern . . . conventions and declarations”
in order to interpret the terms “exhaustible” and “natural resources” in
Article XX(g) of GATT. 81 The Appellate Body did not mention that it was
doing so pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, but its decision clearly
took into account other international law. The EC–Biotech panel also
maintained, although in a more circumscribed manner, that:
[O]ther relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid a
treaty interpreter in establishing, or confirming, the ordinary
meaning of treaty terms in the specific context in which they are
used. Such rules would not be considered because they are legal
rules, but rather because they may provide evidence of the ordinary
meaning of terms in the same way that dictionaries do. 82
This limited use of other international law in interpretation constitutes
(once more) an implicit institutional choice: a decision to focus WTO
dispute settlement, at least formally, on interpretation of the covered
agreements in light of their context, object, and purpose, while limiting the
scope for taking into account other international law. This decision not to
take into account other international law in judicial interpretation on a
general basis constitutes an institutional choice to assign to the political
processes the job of reconciliation of diverse rules of international law.
From a legal realist (non-formalist) perspective, nonetheless, a panel
could take account of other international law without acknowledging it.
The core legal realist claim is that, in practice, judges decide cases in
response to factual context and not simply in response to formal rules and
Biodiversity, while the United States had signed it but not ratified it.
79. EC–Biotech Panel Report, supra note 75, ¶ 7.72. (“[I]t is important to note that the present case
is not one in which relevant rules of international law are applicable in the relations between all
parties to the dispute, but not between all WTO Members, and in which all parties to the dispute
argue that a multilateral WTO agreement should be interpreted in the light of these other rules of
international law. Therefore, we need not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a situation
we would be entitled to take the relevant other rules of international law into account.”).
80. Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 17
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
81. United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶¶ 130–32.
82. EC–Biotech Panel Report, supra note 75, ¶ 7.92.
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legal doctrine. Judges are viewed as situated decision-makers who respond
to disputes in light of particular social, political, and historical contexts that
shape their views of the facts of a particular case. 83 The texts of
agreements are seen as having a degree of malleability (or incompleteness)
that can be adapted (or filled out) in light of these contexts. 84
This legal realist perspective on judicial interpretation has both
rationalist and constructivist dimensions. From a rationalist perspective, an
international judicial body wishes to avoid conflict with other international
bodies that could spur challenges to its legitimacy and authority. It thus
has incentives to interpret and apply legal provisions in a way that
accommodates conflicting provisions in another regime when it can, even
while it explicitly writes that it is not doing so, especially in high-stakes
disputes that generate significant publicity and possibly mass protests. In
this way, the Appellate Body can limit the tension between the WTO and
other international regimes in a fragmented international law system and
seek to limit political backlash against its decisions that touch on
environmental, social, or other political issues, the potential of which is
reinforced and signaled by such other regimes. From a constructivist
perspective, a judicial body’s interpretation and application of a text will be
informed by historical, political, and social context. The judicial body will
be part of a “community of interpreters” of that text as applied within
such a context. 85 From this perspective, WTO jurists may be persuaded by
and internalize principles and norms from neighboring international law
regimes, and incorporate those principles and norms into their reading and
application of WTO texts. One reason states negotiate some international
agreements is to attempt to loosen the constraints of WTO rules. 86
Through these other agreements, they seek to provide signals to WTO
judicial decision-makers. 87
From a welfare perspective, is this current arrangement for dispute
settlement of WTO and other international law efficient? Its efficiency
83. See, e.g., Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1728–31 (1990).
Also of note is William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s concept of “practical reasoning” in statutory
interpretation, “eschew[ing] objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive
reasoning . . . seeking contextual justification . . . .” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 n.3 (1990).
84. See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); Shaffer, supra note 4, at 70; Trachtman,
supra note 11.
85. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 45; Johnstone, supra note 45; Steinberg, supra note 45.
86. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010) (discussing the Biosafety Protocol
and UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions as examples).
87. Id.; see also Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 634 (discussing legislative signaling in the international
context).
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depends in part on the relative efficiency of the substance of WTO law
compared to other international law. In economics, trade liberalization is
viewed as economically efficient for all states, enhancing both national and
global welfare, subject to the caveat that some powerful states can, in some
circumstances, enhance their economic welfare through trade restrictions
at other states’ expense. 88
Further, from a welfare perspective, if we assume states are acting
rationally, and if we assume that international law is not biased due to the
exercise of asymmetric power or subject to other strategic problems (two
large assumptions), then we can infer that states have determined that it
would increase efficiency to provide for stronger enforcement of WTO
law, while implicitly determining that it would not be as valuable to
provide for equally strong enforcement of other international law. Given
the need to make strong assumptions here, such an inference of efficiency
in a welfare sense rests on shaky ground. Stronger reasons exist to infer
efficiency from the standpoint of maximizing the political welfare of
government officials, in a public choice sense. 89 From the perspective of
political welfare, constituencies interested in WTO rules have been able to
elevate the importance of WTO rules among government priorities.
While it is clear that a limited mandate for the Appellate Body and
panels’ jurisdiction accentuates the phenomenon of “fragmentation” of
international law, pursuant to which different types of international law are
separated both at the stages of negotiation and judicial application, it is
also possible that states would prefer different types of dispute settlement
mechanisms for different types of international law (such as trade,
environmental, and human rights law). Thus, the acceptance by states of
this type of fragmentation could be viewed as an acceptance of an
institutional choice to differentiate among types of international law in
terms of the available institutional infrastructure. States may, for example,
only agree to the terms of certain international agreements because judicial
enforcement is weak, thus leaving interpretation of the meaning of such
terms to non-judicial processes.
There are nonetheless welfare-oriented arguments for recognizing other
international law in WTO dispute settlement in order to constrain trade
88. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY (5th ed. 2000) (noting that states with terms of trade power are able to
increase their own welfare by imposing tariffs on imports). Of course, not all WTO law embodies
trade liberalization; some WTO law authorizes states to act illiberally.
89. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation
Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 27 (1996) (using
public choice theory to explain aspects of WTO system); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5 (1996); Alan O. Sykes,
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
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liberalization. This choice can be understood from an “embedded
liberalism” perspective that recognizes that in order to establish the
political conditions for liberalism, it is necessary to engage in some
measure of redistributive and other social regulation. 90 The embedded
liberalism concept links considerations of welfare economics with other
political considerations. Redistributive regulation is viewed as necessary to
induce those who would otherwise be hurt by liberalization to accept
liberalization that will increase aggregate social welfare, and thus legitimize
the regime.
Finally, if WTO law always trumps other international law in WTO
dispute settlement, this scenario raises issues of institutional choice from
the perspective of participation. Those states and other actors participating
in other international law regimes that do not benefit from automatic and
binding dispute settlement are disfavored. Therefore, the de facto
supremacy of WTO law would again call into question the legitimacy of
establishing a de facto structural hierarchy through negotiations among
trade officials, without extensive participation of officials responsible for
other substantive areas.
In sum, the exclusion of the determination of rights and duties under
other international law from the mandate of WTO dispute settlement can
be understood as an implicit institutional decision (whether made by treaty
design or through interpretive choice): a decision to leave other
international law to the general institutional mechanism for application and
enforcement of international law (or to other discrete mechanisms), while
providing a special mechanism for application and enforcement of WTO
law. This move may be viewed as an implicit elevation of WTO law above
other international law — a type of “structural supremacy” — and it
therefore raises questions regarding the legitimacy of establishing a de
facto structural hierarchy of international law through negotiations among
trade officials. It can thus be argued that if the WTO dispute settlement
process declines to give effect to broadly accepted values embodied in
other international law, the WTO itself will lose legitimacy. 91

C.

Textual Incorporation of Other International Law; Delegation to
International Standard-Setting Bodies

As discussed in Part II.B, the authors of the WTO treaties decided to
delegate certain decision-making authority to external standard-setting
bodies. However, the terms of this delegation allowed considerable room
90. John Gerard Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in CONSTRUCTING
62, 73 (1998) (stating that the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise
is that “multilateralism [is] predicated upon domestic interventionism”).
91. See Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 386 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heikanen eds., 2001).
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for interpretation by panels and the Appellate Body. In the EC–Sardines
case, the Appellate Body examined the effect within the WTO legal system
of an international standard for labeling in connection with sardines. 92 The
European Communities (EC) argued that the EC regulation was “based
on” Codex Standard 94, as required by Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement,
because it adopted the portion of Codex Standard 94 that reserves the
term “sardines” exclusively for sardina pilchardus. 93 It argued that this
relationship satisfies the requirement for a “rational relationship” between
the international standard and the technical regulation, as required by
Article 2.4. The Appellate Body ruled against the EC, finding that the
Codex standard could not be the “basis” for the EC regulation since the
EC regulation and the Codex standard were contradictory. 94 This
interpretation of the meaning of “basis” delineates the institutional
relationship between the WTO and Codex Alimentarius. The Appellate
Body agreed with the panel’s use of the earlier EC–Hormones decision,
which had applied an analogous provision under the SPS Agreement. 95 In
the EC–Hormones case, the Appellate Body found that, in order for an
international standard to be “used ‘as a basis for’ a technical regulation”
under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, that standard must be “used as
the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of
enacting the technical regulation.” 96 Incorporation by reference of other
international treaties generally entails interesting interpretive problems
regarding the meaning of these treaty provisions. Appellate Body
interpretations of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention have
been subject to academic scrutiny and critique.97
These interpretive choices can be assessed according to whether they
have been faithful to the intent of the drafters of these provisions
92. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC–Hormones Appellate Body Report];
Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 214, 243
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report].
93. EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 92, ¶ 241.
94. Id. ¶ 248.
95. Id. ¶ 242 (citing EC–Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 92, ¶ 166).
96. EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 92, ¶ 243.
97. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property
System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1207–09 (2009)
(criticizing WTO panel’s interpretation of the Berne Convention in Panel Report, United States–Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)); Gail E. Evans, Recent Developments in the
Protection of Trademarks and Trade Names in the European Union: From Conflict to Coexistence?, 97
TRADEMARK REP. 1008, 1021–22 (2007) (describing how the Appellate Body interpreted the Paris
Convention in Appellate Body Report, United States–Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002)); Daniel Gervais, China–Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 549–50 (2009) (describing WTO
panel’s interpretation of the Berne Convention in Panel Decision, China–Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009)).
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regarding the applications of rules produced outside the WTO. The use of
these rules may be understood as adding to the welfare efficiency of these
provisions, to the extent that the expertise brought to bear in the
formulation of these rules helps to safeguard against the use of regulation
for discriminatory, protectionist purposes. We discuss the role of expertise
in more detail in Subpart D below. The Appellate Body also seems to have
been careful to ensure that Members are not able to depart from these
rules too widely, in keeping with the goal of minimizing protectionist use
of technical standards. This seems to promote both welfare efficiency and
political efficiency. To the extent that these rules are produced under
circumstances of limited transparency, accountability, and legitimacy,
however, the Appellate Body’s applications of these provisions may raise
issues of participation. Indeed, in the EC–Sardines case, the Appellate Body
accepted that international product standards may include not only those
adopted by consensus, but also those that are adopted based on majority
voting. 98

D.

Delegation to Experts Regarding Factual Issues

In determining how to interpret textual language as applied to a specific
factual setting, judicial bodies often seek expert advice. In the WTO
context, they do so when deciding whether to defer broadly to national
regulatory decisions or to subject them to stricter scrutiny, whether in
terms of the substance of the claims or in terms of the domestic
procedures used.
This form of delegation of institutional authority can be viewed as
technocratic, or expert-based. In requesting experts’ views and taking them
into account, panels are engaging in a form of delegation, although this
delegation is only a partial one, as the panels retain authority to determine
how to make use of the experts’ views. Nonetheless, to the extent that the
experts shape the perspectives of the panels regarding factual contexts,
they may wield considerable authority.99
In cases that raise environmental and health-related issues, WTO panels
have typically called on experts to testify about these issues in order for the
panels to weigh the factual evidence. Under Article 13.2 of the DSU,
panels are permitted to establish “expert review groups.” 100 This authority
has not yet been used to create “expert review groups” per se, 101 but it has
98. EC–Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 92, ¶¶ 222–27.
99. See, e.g., ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at ch. 9) (on file with the Virginia
Journal of International Law Association); Damian Chalmers, ‘Food for Thought’: Reconciling European
Risks and Traditional Ways of Life, 66 MOD. L. REV. 532 (2003).
100. DSU, supra note 10.
101. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325
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been used by panels to receive testimony from experts on an individual
basis regarding complex scientific and other determinations. Panels have
done so in eight cases involving environmental, food safety, and
phytosanitary questions: Australia–Salmon, EC–Asbestos (initial panel and
Article 21.5 panel), Japan–Agricultural Products, Japan–Apples, EC–Biotech,
EC–Hormones, United States–Continued Suspension (a follow-up case to EC–
Hormones), and United States–Shrimp. They have cited these experts’ views in
support of their decisions. 102
For example, in EC–Biotech, the panel called on six scientific experts to
testify, asking them detailed questions regarding the risks posed by
particular genetically-modified agricultural products and whether the EU
member state bans on such products were supported by risk
assessments. 103 Similarly, the panel in United States–Shrimp used experts to
examine environmental questions on which key legal issues turned. 104 The
panel asked the parties for a list of individuals having expertise on matters
of sea turtle conservation, and then selected five marine biologists from
this list to report to it as individual experts.105 The panel asked the experts
detailed questions concerning the status of sea turtles in the complainants’
waters, their migratory patterns, the relative effectiveness of the
complainants’ sea turtle conservation measures, the relation of shrimp
trawling to sea turtle conservation, and the socio-economic conditions of
(2002).
102. United States–Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 65; EC–Biotech Panel
Report, supra note 75; Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R
(July 15, 2003); Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC–Asbestos Appellate Body
Report]; Panel Report, European Community–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000); Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998); United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report, supra note 50; Panel
Report, Australia–Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998); EC–
Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 92; see also Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s
Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675, 680 (2009) (noting panel’s reliance on experts in EC–Hormones
decision); James Harrison, Significant International Environmental Law Cases, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 409, 413–14
(2007) (discussing panel’s use of individual experts in EC–Biotech decision); David Winickoff et al.,
Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81,
111 (2005) (“In prior cases under the SPS Agreement, the panels sought advice from experts in
relevant sciences and risk-assessment fields to help guide their decisions.”).
103. Antonia Eliason, Science Versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The (Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific
Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in EC–Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 341, 382–
84 (2009) (describing questions and answers of experts in EC–Biotech).
104. Panel Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter United States–Shrimp Panel Report].
105. The expert group was created pursuant to Article 13.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which authorizes panels to seek information
from any relevant source, including by requesting an advisory report in writing from an expert review
group. All five members were marine biologists and three of them (Scott Eckert and Jack Frazier
from the United States and Hock Chark Lieu of Malaysia) were members of the Marine Turtle
Specialist Network of the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature).
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the shrimping industry. 106 In this way, WTO judicial bodies can try to take
account of the trade, environmental, developmental, and other social
interests and concerns at stake.
The use of such expertise in decision-making can be controversial. On
the one hand, WTO panels can better check the reasoning of the
regulating Member against expert opinion to assess whether its regulatory
rationales pass muster. Yet, as shown in debates over risk regulation
between rationalists (such as Cass Sunstein) and culturalists (such as Dan
Kahan), expertise-based accountability mechanisms (focused on
effectiveness) are in tension with those of democratic politics (focused on
responsiveness). 107 In the context of multi-level governance, internal
accountability mechanisms within national democracies are in tension with
the external accountability mechanisms of WTO technocratic review
through partial delegation of fact-finding to experts. 108
WTO law broadly, and adjudication in particular, maintains a complex
relationship with neo-classical economics. Some of the concepts used in
WTO law, such as “market,” “like products,” “subsidization,” “injury,”
and “price suppression,” have cognates in economics. However, these
cognates may, at times, be false if the economic concept is not what was
intended by the treaty language. Applying these terms thus raises delicate
issues of interpretation. To the extent that it is accepted that the intent was
to ascribe the meaning to a particular term as used in economics, and
economists are requested to provide their analyses in this light, this choice
again involves a partial delegation of decision-making to technical experts.
Parties to WTO disputes increasingly turn to economists for support in
making the factual case for a WTO violation, and WTO panels
increasingly cite the economists’ views in support of their decisions. For
example, in cases assessing the existence of tax discrimination between
competitive products, parties have supplied econometric data regarding
106. Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, in
POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130, 152 (Michael Barnett & Bud Duvall eds., 2005); see also John
H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 45 & n.185 (2004).
107. Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
149–74 (2005) (advocating cost-benefit analysis), with Dan Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR (2005)) (“[T]he complexity of reconciling rational risk regulation with democratic
decisionmaking”). See also ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 26–34 (2006) (contrasting what she terms “rational-instrumental” and
“deliberative-constitutive” administrative approaches to risk regulation).
108. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 149 (David Held & Mathias KoenigArchibugi eds., 2003) (describing how internal democracy does not assure external accountability).
Grant and Keohane have categorized accountability mechanisms into seven types, which they term
hierarchical, legal, market, public reputational, fiscal, supervisory, and peer. See Ruth Grant & Robert
Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 35–36 (2005).
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the cross-elasticity of demand of such products, which panels have cited in
support of their findings. 109 Similarly, in the United States–Cotton case, the
Appellate Body was required to review, among other matters, a finding by
the Panel that U.S. cotton subsidies had caused “significant price
suppression.” 110 The interpretation and application of the requirement that
the U.S. subsidy “cause” “significant price suppression” required reliance
on at least some economic analysis, as well as legal analysis. The question
of whether “significant price suppression” exists is partially one of legal
interpretation to determine the applicable measure that is challenged, as
well as the meaning of the treaty provision, and partially one of assessment
of facts regarding suppression of world prices, for which economic data is
needed. The question of causation also requires both a legal standard of
causation and the use of economic theory and methodology in the factual
analysis. The panel did not engage in its own economic analysis in this
case, nor did it state that it fully relied on economic analyses performed by
the complainant’s experts, yet it did cite their economic evidence in
support of its findings. 111
Just as the hard sciences provide tools to determine whether there is a
scientific basis for a sanitary measure, economics provides tools to
determine the effects of subsidies on prices. Thus, where the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) calls for a
determination by a panel of whether a subsidy has caused significant price
suppression, a panel can use the information provided by economists,
including expert testimony or reports, just as it has done with scientific
expertise in disputes involving SPS and environmental issues.
Panels have sought and obtained economic information from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding balance of payment issues,
as specifically contemplated in the GATT.112 The panels in Dominican
109. See, e.g., Panel Report, Chile–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 7.71, WT/DS87/R, (Feb. 15, 1999);
Panel Report, Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 10.43, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R (June 26, 1998);
Panel Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 6.32, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R
(May 20, 1996).
110. Appellate Body Report, United States–Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R at 290
(Mar. 3, 2005); see also André Sapir & Joel P. Trachtman, Subsidization, Price Suppression and Expertise:
Causation and Precision in Upland Cotton, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 183 (2008).
111. Panel Report, United States–Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶¶ 7.1207–1209, WT/DS267/R (Sept.
8, 2004) (“[W]e observe that the simulations were prepared by experts, and explained to the Panel by
experts. The outcomes of the simulations are consistent with the general proposition that subsidies
bestowed by Member governments have the potential to distort production and trade and the
elimination of subsidies would tend to reduce ‘artificial’ incentives for production in the subsidizing
Member. This is one of the underlying rationales for the establishment of the subsidy disciplines in
the SCM Agreement. . . . [W]e have taken the analyses in question into account where relevant to our
analysis of the existence and nature of the subsidies in question, and their effects, under the relevant
provisions of the SCM Agreement, and have attributed to them the evidentiary weight we deemed
appropriate.”).
112. GATT, supra note 13, art. XV (“In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are
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Republic–Cigarettes and India–Quantitative Restrictions, for instance, used such
information. In each case, the panels used the respective IMF position to
support their decisions against the respondents. 113
Panels have not (formally) consulted individual experts on economic
issues, in contrast to their consultation of scientific experts on
environmental and food safety issues. Economists are, however, part of
the WTO secretariat and can assist panels informally (which in turn can
raise concerns about the transparency of the judicial decision-making
process). The determination of evidence invoking economic concepts,
such as the causation of significant price suppression by competitive
products, would seem amenable to a report from an expert review group
comprised of economists with expertise in trade economics and
econometrics. Article 13 of the DSU has been found to provide panels
with broad flexibility to utilize experts, so it is notable that economic
experts have not (formally) been used. 114 Article 24 of the SCM Agreement
calls for the establishment of a “Permanent Group of Experts” to perform
certain functions under that agreement, such as assisting panels with issues
relating to prohibited subsidies. 115 However, given the limited mandate
under the SCM Agreement for its permanent group of experts, one
alternative is to utilize expert review groups under Article 13 of the DSU.
Instead of choosing this option, panels have so far relied on the litigants to
bring their own experts (or informally, on internal WTO secretariat
members who are economists or have training in economics), and then
determined which parties presented the better argument. 116 Yet, as Scott
Brewer maintains, “A non[-]expert cannot independently and directly
check complex theoretical propositions that do not have simple
observational consequences . . . . Whatever checking the non[-]expert can

called upon to consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments
or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund.”).
113. Panel Report, Dominican Republic–Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes,
¶ 7.138, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Dominican Republic–Cigarettes Panel Report]; Panel
Report, India–Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 5.12,
WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999).
114. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, The WTO Secretariat and the Role of Economics in Panels and Arbitrations,
in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 391,
417–18 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).
115. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views
from the Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1505, 1532 & n.63 (2003);
Pauwelyn, supra note 101, at 331 (“In cases involving complex economic matters, panels should,
however, overcome their professional pride . . . and appoint economic experts.”). Economists do
provide ex post analysis of all Appellate Body decisions, jointly authored with legal scholars. See THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES ON WTO CASE LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
116. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States–Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, Corr.1, and
Add.1–3, Mar. 21, 2005 (as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS267/AB/R, Mar. 3, 2005).
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manage must rely on indirect devices like demeanor, credentials, and
reputation.” 117
Economists have sometimes assessed how WTO texts incorporate
economic concepts that are congruent with economic welfare analysis.118
Where such congruence exists, greater precision in the application of these
concepts would improve economic welfare. The use of experts also could
be viewed as enhancing overall political welfare if the economic concepts
are consistently applied without favoring some Members over others. It
can be argued that where the treaty framers expressed rights and
obligations in terms of economic concepts, they implicitly called for an
accurate use of those economic concepts. From the perspective of
participation, since panels may take into account expert opinion either
expressly or less transparently, the creation of expert review groups could
increase the transparency of this process.
Yet, expertise is no guarantee against bias or ideology, and affected
stakeholders will be concerned, in particular, if questions raising value
judgments (such as economic development policy) are being delegated to
unaccountable economic experts who help to justify in technocratic terms
judicial decisions with political implications. There are, in short, important
limits to the usefulness of expert methods. In particular, when diverse
values must be balanced, economics cannot assist in the commensuration
among them. Panels may use experts to justify their decisions from a
technical perspective, but such deference to technical judgment will not
necessarily avoid legitimacy challenges where particular social priorities are
at stake. Stakeholders will raise questions about the participation
characteristics or the legitimacy of assigning even partial decision-making
to expert groups of economists and scientists. Experts’ assessments of the
underlying facts can nonetheless assist panels in making the ultimate
institutional choices at stake, such as whether to defer to a national
measure, engage in judicial balancing, turn to process-based review, or
issue a clear bright-line rule against categories of measures, thus leaving
ultimate outcomes to market processes.

E.

The Institutional Choice of Judicial Balancing

WTO panels and the Appellate Body face particularly difficult
institutional choices where WTO disputes raise conflicts between diverse
values and social priorities. This situation is evident in cases involving
Article XX of the GATT and its analogue for trade in services, Article
117. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1604
(1998).
118. See the analyses prepared in connection with the American Law Institute project on Legal
and Economic Principles of World Trade Law (2001–09) available at http://tinyurl.com/3wpfykh.
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XIV of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). In some
cases, the Appellate Body has explicitly interpreted certain of these
provisions as requiring a balancing approach. In others, it has appeared to
back off of a full balancing approach by permitting the Member to choose
its “level of protection” (such as a zero tolerance) and then asking if this
level can be reached through a less trade-restrictive means of regulation
(finding that nothing is as effective as an import ban to achieve it).
The Appellate Body most notably formulated and applied a judicial
balancing approach in a case involving a requirement of the Republic of
Korea that retailers make a choice of only selling Korean or foreign
beef. 119 Korea’s alleged regulatory rationale was to ease monitoring of the
labeling of the origin of beef sold in Korea to ensure compliance with
regulations against deceptive marketing practices, as there was evidence
that Korean retailers were selling lower-priced U.S. beef as Korean beef.
The Appellate Body responded by applying a judicial balancing test
involving (at least) three variables in determining whether the Korean
measure was “necessary” to secure compliance with Korea’s anti-fraud
regulations under its Unfair Competition Act for purpose of Article XX(d)
of the GATT. The Appellate Body concluded:
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not
“indispensable”, may nevertheless be “necessary” within the
contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of
weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include
the contribution made by the compliance measure to the
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the
common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and
the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or
exports. 120
It explicated each of these three listed variables with respect to the
question of whether a Member’s regulatory measure is “necessary” for
purposes of GATT Article XX, maintaining:
• “The more vital or important those common interests or
values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a
measure designed as an enforcement instrument”; 121

119. Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea–Beef Appellate Body
Report]. See also Dominican Republic–Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 113, ¶ 7.0 (affirming the
“weighing and balancing” by the judicial body of these factors).
120. See Korea–Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 119, ¶ 164 (emphasis added).
121. Id. ¶ 162.
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• “The greater the contribution [to the realization of the end
pursued], the more easily a measure might be considered to
be ‘necessary”;122 and
• “A measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported
products might more easily be considered as ‘necessary’
than a measure with intense or broader restrictive
effects.” 123
After reiterating that Members have the right to determine for themselves
the level of enforcement of their domestic laws, the Appellate Body
“assume[d] that in effect Korea intended to reduce considerably the number
of cases of fraud,” and not “totally eliminate[] fraud with respect to the
origin of beef,” as it had contended. 124 It then found that Korea’s measure
was not necessary because a less trade-restrictive alternative was reasonably
available to achieve this aim, such as “devot[ing] more resources to its
enforcement efforts.” 125
Yet, the Appellate Body did not fully articulate how to conduct the
balancing test, and, in particular, did not prescribe explicit cost-benefit
analysis from a law-and-economics perspective. It appears that the
balancing test prescribed is to proceed by a kind of gestalt, rather than by
aggregating the value of costs and benefits. It was also unclear in Korea–Beef
how this balancing test related to the traditional test, which asks whether
an alternative measure that is less restrictive of trade is reasonably available
to meet the Member’s policy goal.
In other cases, the Appellate Body, while consistently referring to the
Korea–Beef balancing test, has avoided engaging in explicit judicial balancing
by applying the least trade-restrictive alternative test after finding that the
purpose of the regulatory measure was to reduce a given risk as much as
possible. For example, in EC–Asbestos, the Appellate Body found that the
level of protection chosen by France was “a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestosrelated health risks.” 126 The less trade-restrictive alternative proposed by
Canada of “controlled use” of asbestos would not contribute to the
realization of this goal to the same extent as would a “prohibition.” 127 In
United States–Gambling, the Appellate Body confirmed that a “‘reasonably
available’ alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve for
the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection
with respect to the objective pursued.” 128 Likewise, in Brazil–Tyres, the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. ¶ 163.
Id.
Id. ¶ 178.
Id. ¶ 180.
EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 102, ¶ 168.
Id. ¶¶ 174–75.
United States–Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 64, ¶ 308.
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Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that “Brazil’s chosen level of
protection is the reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation to the
maximum extent possible,” and found that other measures could not
contribute to the achievement of this objective in an equivalent manner. 129
It is not clear how the Appellate Body will reconcile the right of a
Member to determine its chosen level of protection with the criterion in a
balancing test of evaluating the importance of the value protected.130 The
Appellate Body attempted to do so partially in the EC–Asbestos case, where
it referred to its decision in Korea–Beef.131 There, the Appellate Body
pointed out that the protection of human life from the risk of asbestos “is
both vital and important in the highest degree,” suggesting that, per the
Korea–Beef balancing criteria, the more important the common interests or
values pursued, the easier it would be to accept the national measure as
necessary. 132 Moreover, the Appellate Body noted that, in determining
whether another alternative method is reasonably available, it is
appropriate to consider the extent to which the alternative measure
“contributes to the realization of the end pursued.” 133 This language
suggests that there may be some cases in which it is appropriate to restrict
the degree to which a state may expect to achieve its appropriate level of
protection. If so, it arguably represents a significant departure from the
conventional understanding of “reasonably available,” which would
consider the costs of the alternative regulation, but not the degree of its
contribution to the end pursued.
In this line of cases, the Appellate Body can be viewed as arrogating to
itself a great deal of authority to balance substantive concerns implicated
by a trade restriction. In the cases that hold a Member’s policy goals
inviolate, in contrast, it can be viewed as deferring to a greater extent to
the importing Member’s policy goals and measures to achieve them. From
an economic welfare perspective, insights from a full cost-benefit analysis
may improve economic efficiency, leading to increased economic welfare.
However, there are important arguments for a retreat from cost-benefit
analysis and even from an imprecise balancing test, based on the difficulty
129. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 144, 156,
WT/DS332/AB/R, (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil–Tyres Appellate Body Report]. See also Chad P.
Bown & Joel P. Trachtman, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act,
8 WORLD TRADE REV. 85, 124 (2009).
130. See Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, TBT, SPS, and GATT: A Map of the WTO Law of
Domestic Regulation, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2002). Cf. Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in
GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV.
347 (2007) (arguing that the Appellate Body decided EC–Asbestos, United States–Gambling, and
Dominican Republic–Cigarettes on the principle that Members get to choose their own level of
protection).
131. EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 102, ¶ 172.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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of commensuration between diverse values and concerns, as well as on the
expertise of WTO tribunals for such a task. 134 To the extent that the
legitimacy of the WTO Appellate Body would be challenged were it to
engage in explicit balancing in such cases, this approach is not desirable
from the perspective of the political welfare of the overall WTO system,
and thus of the political welfare of the officials of individual Members.
From the perspective of participation, open-ended judicial balancing
tests privilege the judicial process compared to determinations made by a
political process. In contrast to either deference to national decisionmaking or to a bright line rule as applied in the GATT United States–Tuna
case discussed next, judicial balancing creates greater uncertainty. This
approach can thus be viewed as favoring those states that are best able to
engage in full-scale litigation on a case-by-case basis. Large and wealthy
states who are repeat players in WTO litigation are able to mobilize legal
resources more cost-effectively than smaller and poorer ones. The
dynamics of full-scale litigation can thus favor large and wealthy states and,
indirectly, the constituents that they represent in these disputes.
Yet, in creating uncertainty, the Appellate Body may also open space for
multilateral political negotiations in other fora, fostering the political
institutional alternative discussed above. Through an in-depth examination
of rival policy claims and their impacts, the Appellate Body and panel can
help frame subsequent bilateral and multilateral negotiations between
disputing parties. In other words, institutional choices should not be
viewed as static, because institutional processes can dynamically interact.

F.

Delegation to Markets

In a number of contexts, the meaning of critical WTO legal terms can
be determined in light of market practice. In other cases, judicial
interpreters can apply interpretive choices that directly allocate decisions to
market processes. For example, in evaluating national measures under
GATT Articles I, III, and XI, together with the exceptions of Article XX,
we have seen how panels and the Appellate Body often review them in
relation to alternative measures that are less restrictive of trade. Import
bans can be particularly scrutinized because of the frequent availability of
more market-friendly means to inform consumers of foreign
environmental and other social impacts, such as product labeling. Product
labeling, in particular, can inform consumption decisions (and, indirectly,
foreign production decisions) in a less draconian manner. Taking such a
labeling approach effectively shifts decision-making over the appropriate
balance among trade, environmental, development, and other social goals
134. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 32 (1998).
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from a national political process to the market. The GATT United States–
Tuna case took this route, accepting environmental labeling regimes as not
in violation of the Article I MFN obligation of GATT. 135
WTO judicial decision-makers can apply interpretive choices that
delegate decision-making away from national political processes to
markets. Arguably, the most famous example of this situation is WTO
panels’ handling of domestic regulatory measures based on production and
process methods (PPMs) in the absence of multilaterally-agreed rules. The
(in)famous United States–Tuna case and the initial WTO panel in the United
States–Shrimp case took both involved U.S. regulatory restrictions based on
fishing methods, a type of PPM. 136 These cases addressed U.S. regulatory
bans on the import of products from countries that did not have a marine
species conservation program comparable in effectiveness to the relevant
U.S. regulatory program. Neither panel deferred to the U.S. national
regulation that restricted the marketing of foreign products in the United
States on account of the alleged lack of adequate regulation of the PPMs
abroad. 137 The panel in United States–Tuna stated:
[I]f the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the
United States were accepted, each contracting party could
unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The
General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral
framework for trade among all contracting parties but would
provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited
number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations. 138
Similarly, the initial WTO panel in United States–Shrimp found that,
although the U.S. regulation was not discriminatory on its face, by
“conditioning access to the U.S. market” on a change in a foreign
government’s environmental regulatory policy, the U.S. measure “threatens
the multilateral trading system.” 139 The panel’s broad ruling was based on
135. Tuna–Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 39, § 5.44.
136. Panel Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.24-.26,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) (describing U.S. justification for restrictions); Panel Report, United
States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.24, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
155 (1993) (describing U.S. justification for restrictions).
137. Panel Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 8.1,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) (finding U.S. restrictions unjustified); Panel Report, United States–
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.34, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155
(1993) (finding U.S. restrictions unjustified).
138. Id. § 5.27.
139. United States–Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶¶ 7.48, 7.51; see id. ¶¶ 7.44, 7.45, 7.51,
7.55, 7.60, 7.61 (repeating the assertion of a threat to the system nine times); see also Shaffer, supra
note 106, 130–60.
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the type of measure affecting trade, a PPM, and not on the measure’s
social purpose or the details of its implementation. The two panel
decisions effectively maintained that PPM-based measures that did not
affect products (as such) were in violation of GATT rules, so that foreign
products using different PPMs could not be restricted. As a result, these
products would effectively be in competition with each other, and
consumers would decide between them based on advertising and
(potentially) labeling regimes regarding the PPM.
This type of market-based model has many benefits from the
perspective of participation in the decision-making process. A marketbased decision-making mechanism can permit more individualized
participation in determining the proper balance between trade,
environmental, and other social goals. In this manner, markets can
enhance democratic voice. Marketers can label their products in terms of
social preferences. Consumers, informed through advertising campaigns,
can choose which products to buy on the basis of how they are produced,
such as “dolphin-safe” tuna or “GMO-free” foods. In choosing between
products, consumers implicitly choose among alternative regulatory
regimes for the production of particular products. Such a WTO approach
could stimulate not only product competition, but also regulatory
competition. 140 Different regulatory approaches would be in competition
when consumers select which product to buy. In purchasing a product,
one would effectively be voting for one regulatory system over another.
From a welfare perspective, such an interpretive approach to the
handling of regulatory measures based on PPMs in the absence of
multilateral agreements can foster greater commercial certainty, thereby
facilitating cross-border trade, promoting development, and protecting a
liberal international trading system. The market decision-making
mechanism, however, is also subject to bias, resulting in skewed
participation in the determination of the appropriate balance of the policy
concerns. Markets are subject to information asymmetries, externalities,
and collective action problems. Information costs would be high. The
labels could be misleading, and even if the labels were accurate, many
consumers would not take the time to review them. Some consumers,
even if informed, might decide to buy the cheaper product and “free ride”
on more socially-concerned purchasers. Other purchasers might refrain
from buying a product that is produced in a particular way because they
doubt that their purchasing decisions would be effective in light of other
consumers’ actions. The views of consumers who do not plan on
consuming a particular product (however it is produced) would not be
140. See INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION (William Bratton,
Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto & Colin Scott eds., 1996); REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (Daniel Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2000).
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represented in the market process. Social activists thus fear that
competition between socially-protective regulations and non-socially
protective regulations would result in a “race to the bottom” toward less
protective regulations. 141
Other types of cases in which market or consumer preferences are
critical are those that refer to market competition for a determination of
the “likeness” of products. 142 The reference to competition as the
determinant of “likeness” leaves little room for considering the types of
regulatory distinctions that might not be made by the market. Indeed, the
economic theory of regulation suggests that regulation would often be
necessary precisely where the market fails to make important
distinctions. 143 In these cases, reference to markets might suffer from
deficiencies in welfare and political efficiency. While consumer preferences
are incorporated in market decision-making, regulatory preferences might
be seriously underweighted, diminishing political participation as well.

G.

Vertical (Re-)Allocation: Deference to States

One interpretive choice that some commentators favor is for the WTO
judicial body to show deference to a country implementing a trade
restriction on social policy grounds in reflection of local values, thereby
effectively allocating decision-making authority to a national political
process. Some scholars contend that WTO rules should be interpreted in
deference to the “societal values” of the country imposing the trade
restriction. 144 Environmental activists and many legal scholars further
maintain that WTO rules (and, in particular, GATT Articles III.4 and XX)
should be interpreted to permit trade restrictions imposed on account of
foreign production processes that are environmentally harmful, so long as
the same ban is applied domestically. 145 For example, a WTO panel could
hold that so long as a national regulatory purpose is facially valid, then the
panel will look no further at the regulatory measure chosen, whether in
terms of its impact on trade, its effectiveness, its proportionality, or

141. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1965 (2007) (noting likelihood of “race to the bottom” in climate change
regulation).
142. See EC–Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 102; Japan–Alcoholic Beverages Appellate
Body Report, supra note 49.
143. See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981).
144. Philip Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
145. Daniel Bodansky, What’s So Bad About Unilateral Actions to Protect the Environment?, 11 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 339 (2000); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction — An Illusory Basis
for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249 (2000).
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otherwise. This choice was implicitly made by the Appellate Body in
Brazil–Tyres. 146
The issue of deference is intricately linked to the standard of review
applied by panels. In general, the Appellate Body’s approach to standards
of review has eschewed special deference to states. Rather, in the EC–
Hormones decision, the Appellate Body explained that the appropriate
standard of review is that expressed in Article 11 of the DSU: an objective
assessment of the facts. 147 Even where the drafters of the WTO treaty
seem to have intended an especially deferential standard of review, under
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body has
not so far accorded extensive deference, as noted earlier. Nonetheless, in
some cases, such as United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC–Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body has appeared to scold panels for
being too intrusive in their review. 148 As the Appellate Body stated in that
case, concerning an SPS measure, “the review power of a panel is not to
determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is
correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported
by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this
sense, objectively justifiable.” 149
The institutional choice of deference would entail particular institutional
consequences in terms of social and political welfare, and the participation
of affected stakeholders. Strong policy grounds sometimes exist for
deferring to domestic regulatory choices given the remoteness of
international institutional processes. Participation in democratic decisionmaking at the national level is of a higher quality than at the international
level because of the closer relation between the citizen and the state, the
consequent reduced costs of organization and participation, and the
existence of a sense of a common identity and of communal cohesiveness
— that is, of a demos. National and sub-national processes are better able to
tailor regulatory measures to the demands and needs of local social and
environmental contexts. They are also more likely to respond rapidly and
146. Brazil–Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 129.
147. EC–Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 92, ¶¶ 115–17.
148. United States–Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 65.
149. Id. ¶ 590; see also Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, ¶¶ 182–90, WT/DS296/AB/R (June 27, 2005). In
the United States–DRAMS case, the Appellate Body maintained, “[W]e are of the view that the
‘objective assessment’ to be made by a panel reviewing an investigating authority’s subsidy
determination will be informed by an examination of whether the agency provided a reasoned and
adequate explanation as to: (i) how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (ii)
how those factual findings supported the overall subsidy determination.” Id. ¶ 186. It concluded that
“the Panel failed to apply the proper standard of review and, therefore, failed to comply with its
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU,” because “the Panel went beyond its role as the reviewer of
the investigating authority’s decision and, instead, conducted its own assessment, relying on its own
judgment, of much of the evidence before the USDOC.” Id. ¶ 190.
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flexibly to new developments. This approach applies a principle espoused
in a variety of disciplines, from law to political science to institutional
economics. 150
Yet, national and sub-national political decision-making processes can
be highly problematic from the perspectives of participation,
accountability, and global social and political welfare. First, producer
interests may be better represented than consumer interests on account of
their higher per capita stakes in regulatory outcomes, which can give rise to
economic protectionist legislation, reducing national as well as global social
welfare. 151 Second, even where national and local procedures are relatively
pluralistic — involving broad participation before administrative and
political processes that are subjected to judicial review — they often do
not take account of adverse impacts on foreigners. International law
comes into play precisely where other states have concerns about how
these domestic political choices affect them. If the WTO judicial process
showed complete deference to national political processes, permitting
them to ignore significant effects on foreign interests in a manner contrary
to the obligations set forth in the WTO treaty, then accountability would
suffer in a reciprocal sense: The affected foreign states’ political processes,
and the political process of international law, would be prevented from
inducing states to take into account the foreign effects of their actions.
Members with large markets, such as the United States and European
Union, are often favored by such a deferential approach, which is why
developing countries tend to be wary of deference on social policy
grounds. 152 This institutional choice can permit countries with large
markets to use their market leverage to compel foreign regulatory change
aligned with the large country’s particular preferences. Were the Appellate
Body to defer to national legislation and its administrative application, then
it would effectively allocate decision-making over the appropriate balance
of the trade and other regulatory concerns at stake to national political and
administrative processes.

H. Process-Based Review
As a result, instead of simply deferring to a Member’s policy goals or
engaging in judicial balancing of substantive concerns, the Appellate Body
150. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969) (discussing
the effectiveness of small-sized governmental units based on a number of factors, including the
internalization of externalities); Oliver Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J.
POL. ECON. 123 (1967) (arguing that large organizations encounter the problem of “control loss”
and that this loss may be a reason to reduce the scale of large organizations).
151. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 141–48 (1965).
152. See Shaffer, supra note 67.
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has sometimes reviewed national decision-making processes to attempt to
ensure that they take into account the views of affected foreign parties.
Since the creation of the GATT in 1949, Article X has provided for certain
transparency requirements for the administration of trade regulations.153
While this article was considered to be “subsidiary” to the substantive
provisions of the GATT prior to the WTO, it has been increasingly
enforced by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in recent years, as have
its more detailed analogues in the GATS, TRIPS, SPS, and TBT
agreements.154
The WTO Appellate Body has applied this process-based approach in a
number of cases involving defenses based on social concerns. For
example, in the United States–Shrimp case, “the Appellate Body returned the
substantive issue to a lower vertical level of decision-making — that is,
back to the U.S. Department of State, which was responsible for
implementing the U.S. legislation — subject to certain procedural
conditions.” 155 By reviewing the due process and transparency of the State
Department’s implementing procedures, the Appellate Body attempted to
enhance the representation of affected foreign parties and thereby counter
the national biases of domestic legislative and administrative bodies. 156
In this case, the Appellate Body faulted the United States for the
national biases in its procedures, and effectively required the United States
to create an administrative procedure pursuant to which foreign
governments or traders have an opportunity to comment on U.S.
regulatory decisions that affect them. The Appellate Body held that the
application of the U.S. measure was “arbitrary” in that the certification
process was not “transparent” or “predictable,” and did not provide any
“formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to
any arguments that may be made against it.” 157 The Appellate Body
admonished the United States for failing to take “into consideration
different conditions which may occur in the territories of . . . other
Members,” and recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request

153. Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and
Good Governance, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 779 (2008) (“The oldest transparency and good
governance obligation of the WTO is Article X of [the] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).”); Debra P. Steger, Introduction to the Mini-Symposium on Transparency in the WTO, 11 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 705, 710 (2008) (noting that art. X of the GATT, requiring transparency, has existed since
1947).
154. See Stewart & Sanchez, supra note 57, at 457–94 (citing Argentina–Hides and Leather; Dominican
Republic–Import and Sale of Cigarettes; United States–Customs Bond Directive; EC–Selected Customs Matters;
Japan–Agricultural Products II; Argentina–Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties; Guatemala–Cement II).
155. See Shaffer, supra note 106, at 153.
156. Id.
157. United States–Shrimp I Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶¶ 180, 186.
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that the United States ensure that its policies were appropriate for the local
“conditions prevailing” within the complainant developing countries. 158
Similarly, in the EC–Preferences case, the European Community’s lack of
procedural transparency was the primary ground for the Appellate Body’s
finding against the EC’s scheme. 159 The EC granted special tariff
preferences to a list of twelve countries on the grounds that they
undertook effective programs to combat illicit drug production and
trafficking (the Drug Arrangements). In this case, however, the country
beneficiaries were simply designated up front by the EC, subject to no
defined review criteria. The Appellate Body faulted the EC’s Drug
Arrangements for a series of procedural reasons, including (1) because they
“provide[d] no mechanism under which additional beneficiaries may be
added to the list of beneficiaries”; (2) because they did not “set out any
clear prerequisites — or ‘objective criteria’ — that if met, would allow for
other developing countries ‘that are similarly affected by the drug problem’
to be included as beneficiaries”; and (3) because they did not give any
“indication as to how the beneficiaries . . . were chosen or what kind of
considerations would or could be used to determine the effect of the ‘drug
problem’ on a particular country.” 160
In cases involving Members’ use of trade remedies against dumping and
subsidies, panels and the Appellate Body likewise have sought refuge in
procedural criticisms of national economic analyses, rather than engaging
with the substantive determinations. 161 Panels, for example, have examined
whether national authorities have created a record evidencing that they
considered the required factors. 162 Were panels to use the institutional
alternative of expert review groups, discussed above, they might feel more
comfortable engaging in a full substantive review, but instead they often
have turned to this process-based form of review.
Process-based review may seem desirable, because it is relatively less
intrusive than substantive review and focuses directly on the issue of
158. Id. ¶¶ 164–65, 177, 186–88.
159. See Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the GSP Case: Who Decides the
Conditions for Trade Preferences: The Law and Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 977, 977 (2005).
160. Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, ¶¶ 182–89, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
161. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, (Nov. 10, 2003).
162. See, e.g., Panel Report, Egypt–Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, ¶ 7.34,
WT/DS211/R (Oct. 1, 2002); Appellate Body Report, Thailand–Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001);
Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001); Panel Report, European Communities–Anti-Dumping Duties
on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000); Panel Report, Mexico–
Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan.
28, 2000).
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participation of domestic and foreign parties. However, process-based
review also raises serious concerns, in particular, because processes can be
manipulated to give the appearance of consideration of affected foreigners
without in any way modifying a predetermined outcome. Even if
international case-by-case review were possible (which it is not), it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for an international body to determine the
extent to which a national agency actually takes account of foreign
interests. The challenge remains that Members, particularly powerful ones,
can thus go through the formal steps of due process without meaningfully
considering the views of other affected parties. As a result, WTO panels
and the Appellate Body may retain the interpretive alternatives of judicial
balancing and the application of bright line rules.

CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a new framework for understanding and
evaluating the treaty drafting and interpretive choices confronting WTO
Members and judicial bodies, as part of dynamic processes of institutional
interaction over time regarding the meaning and application of WTO texts.
When Members define rules and standards, and WTO panels and the
Appellate Body interpret them, they make institutional choices that
structure and facilitate social decision-making. These choices are fruitfully
evaluated in terms of which social decision-making process decides a
policy issue, affecting the participation of stakeholders. This form of
institutional analysis provides a proxy that helps us to evaluate the
comparative distributive and efficiency consequences of treaty drafting and
interpretive choices, both in social welfare and public choice terms,
because institutional processes mediate the articulation of individual
preferences.
The analytic framework of this Article permits us to assess the
consequences of alternative treaty drafting and interpretive choices in
comparative institutional choice terms. We have shown how these choices
allocate authority among different social decision-making processes,
which, in turn, interact over time. We have evaluated the consequences of
these allocations both in participatory terms and in terms of the efficiency
and distribution of economic and political welfare. First, these choices
affect the degree of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of social
decision-making. Second, by deciding among such institutional alternatives
as incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to
markets, national deference, and process-based review, these choices help
determine which social decision-making process decides a particular policy
issue in particular cases, thereby affecting the institutional mediation of
individual preferences. Our framework affords a better understanding of
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how WTO panels and the Appellate Body, in practice, have made
alternative institutional choices. It also helps us to more effectively
evaluate the comparative welfare and participatory implications at stake in
these choices. Although we apply this framework to WTO treaty drafting
and judicial interpretation, the framework can be usefully applied in
describing and evaluating choices inherent in the creation and
interpretation of any domestic or international legal text.
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